Page 367 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 349

cy of the operations; the untimeliness of the moment chosen to implement
them; the unfitness of the means deployed for the task that each one of them
had to perform in the general plan.
Moltke soon knew about the French plan: we will see how the covering
action carried out by the Army of the Vosges must be tributed the merit of
causing a moment of doubt in Moltke, since that great general, and even
Werder, although knowing that the Army had began to move from west to
east, doubted for a moment on the real purpose of that manoeuvre, that the
French had not bothered to conceal too much.
The idea of operating in the east came too late. Paris was at the end of its
strength; the forces in the west, disorganized by the recent defeats, were not
the suitable element to engage on their front the overwhelming Prussian
forces of the adversary, and even the least those made available by the surren-
der of Metz and Strasbourg; and therefore Meltke would not have had any
problem in warding off the enemy’s move; all the more so because the tool
used to perform it did not, and could not have the necessary operative capa-
bility to develop rapid and decisive mass actions and its foreseeable slowness
in implementing any action was worsened by the unfavourable weather con-
ditions in which the operations had to take place.
Confronted with an army such as the Prussian, able to manoeuvre very well
and, in addition, exalted by its victory, a formidable war tool for its homo-
geneity, its spirit and offensive means, a far-reaching manoeuvre that had to
be eminently rapid, had very poor possibilities of success in such conditions.
Moltke would make up for lost time and launch the necessary forces to the
flank and behind the French Army, and even more so if the latter instead of
heading resolutely northward would waist time before acting on the Prussian
rearguards, as it was Bourbaki’s intention, to relieve the siege of Belfort.
Which forces would the French oppose to the Prussian troops rushing in
from the west? The protection of Bourbaki’s flank and back, as we said, was
entrusted to Crémer’s Division formed by mobilisés and already virtually
defeated in Nuits, and to the so-called Army of the Vosges whose efficiency
and force have been already discussed. These were really unfit elements for
the requested protective action, as Gambetta had after all already said, and
could at best hide, but not protect the Army, watch and trouble the enemy’s
movements, but never stop him. For an appropriate security action, it would
have been perhaps sufficient an army Corps flanked by those irregular units.