Page 361 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN 1870 - 1871 343

their movements; but with Garibaldi’s surprise, during the night, the
Regiment and its commanding officer– with the exception of some compa-
nies - disappeared. With such troops, any idea of continuing the fight was
absurd; Garibaldi understood it and ordered everybody to go back to Autun,
before the enemy could get over the surprise and resume the chasing.
In fact Werder wanted to resume the offensive on the morning of the 27 th
with all the troops he could concentrate around Dijon during the night,
The Baden troops occupied again Pasques and Lantenay after a short
resistance by the Delpech Brigade and, the morning after, marched on
Sombernon, but without meeting again the main body of the army, that con-
tinued its retreat and on December 1 returned to Autun protected by the
rearguard led by Ricciotti who had to resist some lively actions against
th
Werder’s troops in Arnay-le-Duc, on the 30 . Garibaldi returned to Autun
that same day; although for five days he had tirelessly given generously of
himself, remaining on horseback for many hours, travelling at night, person-
ally organising and directing everything, indifferent to his health conditions,
with an admirable willpower, he inspected in detail the positions that he had
ordered to organise for the defence of the city, and dictated precise and
detailed instructions for the commanding officers of each defence sector.
An attempt of attack by the enemy, on December 1, was definitely
repelled.
The manoeuvre of Dijon, although rationally prepared and led with a
great fighting spirit, had failed. Too great was the disproportion of means
available to each party, even if we consider the force distraction caused by the
sham attack of Châtillon. It is however possible to suppose that the manoeu-
vre could have had a favourable outcome, at the decisive moment, if panic
had not arisen among the mobilisés Battalions and, most of all, if Crémer’s
Division had given its support, uselessly requested by Garibaldi. But this
Division had remained inactive a few kilometres from Dijon, north of Nuits,
and therefore Werder could use all the forces he had at hand to face
Garibaldi’s unexpected attack. Considering the situation of incomplete
organisation of his forces and their generally very poor efficiency, Garibaldi
could use only a limited part of them. And so of the 15.814 men and 18
pieces that formed the Army of the Vosges on December 1, only 6000 men
and the 18 pieces could take part in the offensive; too few to gain the upper
hand over the XIV th Army Corps, and, most of all, to resist alone in Dijon,
if they had succeeded to penetrate there. Despite all this, Garibaldi’s offensive