Page 354 - General Giuseppe GARIBALDI - english version

336 GENERAL GIUSEPPE GARIBALDI

tion of his active elements that had favourable consequences on the operative
efficiency of each of his men and made it possible to carry out the luckiest
undertakings and consequently overcome the most difficult situations. But
what is more surprising in Garibaldi is his unfailing ability to adjust the
means available to the goal to be achieved. Means could often seem to be
lacking, but in reality it was not so. In the history of warfare, few command-
ers could so rationally apply the principle of force economy as Garibaldi did
and as sparingly and with the same vigil caution as he did: he was the com-
mander of the minimum means and could achieve his outcomes because he
put the moral factor always at the basis of his action of command. Few bold
leaders and with a firm heart, active and strongly resolute in their will, ready
to risk everything and, if needed, to sacrifice themselves, have always gained
the upper hand over the many who were not animated by that divine flame
of passion for an idea, even if they fought with a spirit of duty. This is the
fundamental principle that shaped Giuseppe Garibaldi’s command. The
manoeuvre of Dijon clearly summarised its peculiar characteristics.
In the peculiar situation in which the General was, when his poor forces
reached Autun, any other commander would have remained in cautious wait,
at least for the necessary time to complete the organisation of his means.
Indeed, the comparison between his forces and the adversary’s in terms of
quantity and quality was unfavourable to him.
Werder could relay on the Baden Division with three Infantry Brigades,
on 1 Prussian Infantry Brigade and 2 cavalry Brigades; 23 Battalions, 20
Squadrons, 72 pieces. Of these troops, even if we take off 10 Battalions, 8
Squadrons and 16 pieces deployed between Vesoul and Lure and therefore
too far away to intervene timely in an action against the Army of the Vosges,
he still had a formidable troop to face Garibaldi and if we add the 4 th
Division of the reserves marching to reach him - 15 Battalions, 8 Squadrons,
36 pieces - that was already in Vesoul on November 18, we easily understand
Werder’s superiority over his adversary.
The 6000 Garibaldians, of which about 3000 were really operative, sup-
ported by only one mountain Battery, were a mere trifle against Werder’s
forces. Yet, Garibaldi did not hesitate to conceive and implement his offen-
sive plan.
Although the more solid elements of the Brigades – snipers and Italian
volunteers – had been deployed in the front line and barricaded all the pass-