Page 140 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

Finally, the Chief Inspector had to “know the position of radiotelegraphic stations [...] that are
not exclusively relevant to one Radiotelegraphic Section but require cooperation among various
Sections” . This right, when exercised without due precautions in asking for the position of field
16
stations via radio, might provide the enemy with valuable information concerning the deployment
of Italian forces.

The dePloyMenT of ITalIan sTaTIons

When the European war began, the radio resources envisaged for the war zone included the Army
field stations and the fixed stations located inside fortresses and other key places across the territory.
Despite Marconi’s personal availability, over the last months of 1914 considerable delays occurred
in the Marconi Wireless supply of the material required for instance to prepare mobile stations
for Cavalry Units. More powerful equipment needed to complete the fixed-station network in the
areas designated as the Army’s gathering places were not available either. Only during the spring
of 1915, when the participation of Italy in the war as an ally of the Entente Powers became more
likely, those problems started to be gradually solved .
17
To set up field stations, the workshops of the 3 Regiment of the Engineering Corps provided to
rd
place into containers the equipment that could be transported by animals, carts, or military lorries.
Picture 7.4 shows some possible uses of a 1.5 kW cart station.
Outside the war zone, the Army’s fixed stations contributed, along with the Italian navy’s, to
forming the National fixed network. Its structure is shown in Picture 7.5 where connections and
stations managed by the Army are indicated in red .
18
The preparation of field radiocommunications in the war prospective had begun with the manoeuvres
conducted in Veneto in the summer of 1914. One of the major goals of that operation was to analyse
the propagation conditions and the intelligibility of the received telegraphic signals between field
stations installed at adequately selected locations on the north-east border as well as between them
and the fixed stations, forming a star-shaped network with the centre in Treviso. These connections
are marked by the white lines in the picture 7.6, while the field station connections are indicated
by red lines .
19
In the same occasion, the network capability in terms of number of simultaneous communications
that could be carried out within the available waveband were tested, demonstrating that only
four telegraph communications could work simultaneously with no reciprocal disturbance in the
wavelength interval ranging between 700 and 1,200 m, inside the area shown in the picture 7.6. In
fact, the spark gap transmitting equipment commonly employed at that time required considerable
bandwidth, compared to continuous wave (CW) equipment, then unavailable for field applications.
Moreover, personnel skills were tested, mainly to investigate their capability of intercepting enemy
communications .
20

16 ibidem, p.4.
17 The frequent correspondence between the Services Office of the Supreme Headquarters, the Inspectorate of the Engineer
Corps (AUSSME, Series F4, env.7) and the Deployment Office (AUSSME, Series F4, env.8) proves this difficult situation
and shows its evolution.
18 Ministry of the Navy, Consegne di massima per il servizio radiotelegrafico in caso di mobilitazione radiotelegrafica
militare, (General instructions for the radiotelegraphic service in case of military radiotelegraphic mobilisation), extremely
confidential circular letter, 9 April 1914, AUSSME, Series F4, env.7. Stations of the Royal Navy’s national network had 5
to15 kW power.
19 Captain Ugo Levi, Engineer Corps, Relazione sulle esercitazioni radiotelegrafiche alla frontiera NE (Report on the
radiotelegraphic exercises on the north-east border), Florence, 31 August 1914, AUSSME, series F4, env.7.
20 ibidem.

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