Page 139 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER SEVEN

The strongest inconvenience, however, was due to the ease of interception by the enemy,
to the considerable impact of atmospheric disturbance and to the limited number of possible
simultaneous telegraph communications which could be transmitted within a given geographical
area, in the frequency band available at that time. Because of this last weakness, the risk that a
radio communication could suffer strong interferences produced by friendly and enemy stations
tuned on the same as its frequency resulted extremely high. This situation was only partly solved
by the adoption of ‘sound spark gap’ transmitters that allowed distinguishing stations thanks to
their different audible tones as perceived at the reception.
To cope with those issues, all armies decided to limit the number of transmitters and entered war
with a few dozen field radio stations mostly working for High Commands and the Cavalry.

organIzaTIon and regulaTIons
Even when working with a limited number of stations, strict rules and practices would be established
to regulate the radio traffic, mainly in the presence of enemy contemporary emission. To this end,
in September 1914 a special Committee including Army and Navy officers had started working
in Italy for implementing general rules to be applied to all radio communications in case of war .
12
One of the main goals was the definition of the frequency bands assigned to the various categories
of stations as well as the measures to adopt for avoiding mutual interference. Moreover, the control
stations in charge of supervising radio communications and settling any ‘collision’ between radio
stations were designated .
13
The regulations issued in 1914 divide radiotelegraphic stations into four categories: on-board,
coastal, terrestrial fixed and mobile. The Royal navy, in addition to coastal and on-board military
stations managed most of the National fixed radiotelegraphic network.
One of the approved directives reads as follows: “radiotelegraphy must not be used when
communications can take place with different means; […] it is mandatory to always use the
minimum amount of energy required to guarantee communications” . The Engineering Corps
14
Inspectorate reiterated this instruction for the Army, ordering to employ wireless communication
only when ordinary wire telegraphy was unavailable.
The General Regulations provided for the appointment of the Chief Inspector of the STM (Servizio
Telegrafico Militare, Military Telegraphic Service) reporting to the Chief of the Army Staff and
in charge of coordinating the entire telecommunication system within the Army. A Captain would
report to the Inspector for the direction of the Radiotelegraphic Service operating on the theatre of
war, with both field and fixed radiotelegraphic stations .
15
This organization met the need to have a unified coordination of all fixed and mobile stations in the
warzone, regarding for instance the personnel assigned to stations and the distribution of service
codes and ciphers together with the rules for their application, with the exclusion of codes managed
by different bodies, such as the Ministry of War.

12 Ministry of War and Ministry of the Navy, Norme generali comuni per il Servizio RT nel R. Esercito e nella R. Marina
(General Rules for the radiotelegraphic service in the Royal Army and in the Royal Navy), 21 December 1914, AUSSME,
Series F3, env.50.
13 ibidem, p.4- 6.
14 ibidem, p.2 -3.
15 Supreme Headquarters, Promemoria circa l’ordinamento del Servizio telegrafico, telefonico e radiotelegrafico presso
l’Esercito mobilitato (Memorandum regarding the telegraph, telephone and radio telegraphic service in the mobilised army),
10 May 1915, p.1, AUSSME, Series F3, env.50.

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