Page 138 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

During that war, a large effort was required to gather all radio assets immediately available in
Italy or on the international market, not only to quickly develop the Libyan networks but also to
guarantee communications for the troops deployed to the Aegean Sea, Eritrea, and Albania .
7
An extreme lack of resources became evident when the time came to prepare materials, means
of transportation and troops for the mobilization before the beginning of the WWI. Due to the
pressing request for radiotelegraphic stations, the 3 Regiment of the Engineering Corps - which
rd
had been tasked with the Radiotelegraphic Service since 27 August 1912 - did not manage to
recover even the equipment to instruct radiotelegraphic operators .
8
Therefore, right after the war broke out in August 1914, a telegram from Guglielmo Marconi
reassuring the Italian government that he would be completely and “unconditionally” available in
supporting his homeland, was warmly received. General Cadorna, who had been recently appointed
Chief of the Army Staff, decided to immediately ask the Italian office of Marconi Company to
provide a list of equipment available or in preparation at the Marconi plants in Genoa (picture 7.3).
Marquis Solari immediately complied with the request .
9

7.2 THE ARMY RADIO AT ITALY’S ENTRING THE WAR

TechnologIcal lIMITaTIons
At the beginning of the war, the number of fixed and mobile stations in the Italian army, as well as
in other belligerents’ armies, was relatively small when compared to the vastness of fronts and the
large number of fighting units. A larger radio diffusion was prevented by several factors such as,
in the Italian army, the paucity of resources in terms of material and men due to the long-standing
financial problems. However, some general technical constraints related to the technologies
available at that time were perceived by all the Armies.
In an article published in 1914, Luigi Sacco himself, a pioneer in this field, admitted:

Despite the great progress made, it is still not possible to say that, a priori, unlimited trust in
the service that radiotelegraphy could render in a European war is justifiable.
Radiotelegraphy still suffers from considerable drawbacks, which become particularly
significant in war applications. [...] 10
Therefore, its undeniable flaws justify limited and careful use .
11
The bulkiness and weight of equipment represented still an issue that was opposed to an easy
field usage of the radio, above all in a war of movement, although great efforts had been made to
improve the robustness and the handling of equipment and to reduce the amount of time required
to set up and dismantle stations.

7 The Libyan network required 25 radiotelegraph stations and other 7 stations were necessary in other locations.
8 3 Regiment, Telegraphists of the Engineer Corps, Relazione sulle condizioni in cui si è trovato il Reggimento nei riguardi
rd
della preparazione del personale dal 30 settembre 1912 al 31 marzo 1914 (Report on Regiment personnel’s preparation
between 30 September 1912 and 31 March 1914), Florence, 8 April 1914, AUSSME, Series F4, env.8.
9 Marconi’s office, Rome, Letters to the Headquarters of the General Staff Corps, Ufficio Intendenza, Services 0ffice, Object:
Materiali Radiotelegrafici, (Radiotelegraphic materials) signed by Solari, 10,11,12 August 1914, AUSSME, Series F4, env.8.
10 L. Sacco, Note sulle applicazioni campali della Radiotelegrafia (Notes on field applications of radiotelegraphy), Rivista di
Artiglieria e Genio, October, 1914, Vol. IV, p. 82. The text highlights the progress of radiotelegraphy over more recent years,
including the ability to transmit up to twenty words per minute, in undisturbed conditions.
11 ibidem, p. 111.

136