Page 155 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER SEVEN

book and in the 1943 memoirs. As regards the Red Code, Figl takes familiarity with the 1898
edition for granted, underlining its differences with the 1915 editions. Moreover, in both his book
and memoirs, he only recalls the seizure of several copies of the Pocket Military Cipher during
the Austrian attack in the spring of 1916 (Strafexpedition), while he never mentions what Ronge
openly writes about the attainment of this cipher and other ones during peacetime . One could
58
wonder whether Ronge had told his colleagues about the codes holding or had kept them in the
dark to test their ability or, in sports terms, to train them in the view of more arduous challenges .
59
This assumption is implausible for the Pocket Military because its instruction manual had been
translated into German and printed by the Evidenzbüreau in 1912 . Concerning this cipher, it
60
is worth recalling David Kahn’s ironic remark pointing out that Ronge had no reason to be glad
(about the acquisition, A/N) “since it has been a complete waste of money”. In fact, he adds that
Ronge’s excellent fellow analysts would have had no difficulty interpreting dispatches coded by a
system for which well-known decryption methods had existed for decades .
61
On the other hand, the bribing of other Italian ciphers and codes made decryption of intercepted
dispatches considerably easier and faster. Ronge himself acknowledged this in recalling the
“precious contribution” that the acquisition of “three ciphers of the Italian Army (presumably
the Red Code, the Pocket Military Cipher and the Mengarini code, A/N note) represented for the
Austrian cryptographic Service. Without those, our work would have been delayed” .
62
Therefore, he implicitly admits sharing the three ciphers with his colleagues, which extinguishes
any doubt regarding the matter. However, he also adds that the delay mentioned above “would
have been even greater without the expert contribution of Captain Figl to the codes and ciphers
breaking activities, dating back to peacetime” .
63
In more general terms, skilfulness in the attainment of enemy codes has sometimes been stressed
to hide the cryptologic proficiency of analysts, which had to be protected in view of prospective
conflicts. For instance, British Intelligence services strategically attributed the successes achieved
inside the legendary “Room 40” of the Admiralty to HUMINT operations. This occurred during
the war, in occasion of the Zimmermann dispatch decryption, as well as in the post-war period,
when the merits of radiogoniometry rather than cryptography were extolled, particularly with
regard to the sea battles against the German navy . Some authors even explained the partial initial
64
breaking the famous 0075 German code - used for the Zimmermann dispatch - with the availability
of some parts of the code that the young Austrian telegraphist Alexander Szek serving in the big
German station of Brussels, had transmitted to the British Intelligence Office .
65
Conversely at times, crypto analysts would rather not talk about the support obtained through
traditional intelligence methods, thus exalting their own skills, as was seemingly the case with
Andreas Figl.

58 ibidem.
59 This kind of behaviour of persons in charge of Intelligence Services towards their own cryptologists was not unusual. For
instance, right before World War II, Biuro Szyfróf, Chief of the Polish Biuro Szyfróf, knew the daily keys of the Enigma
cipher thanks to the information provided by the German spy Hans-Thilo Schimdt. However, he carefully avoided to make this
source known to the cryptologist Marian Rejewsk in order to spur him to the research finally leading to the famous “bombs”.
60 J. Pricowitsch, Drahtlose Telegaphie, op. cit. p.345. The publication is from the “Evidenzbüreau des k.u.k. Generalstabes
K. Nr. 6500 aus 1912”.
61 D. Kahn, op. cit. p. 317.
62 M. Ronge, Die Radiohorch, op. cit., p. 15.
63 ibidem
64 A. Santoni, op. cit. p. 47 - 61.
65 F. Pratt, op. cit., p. 240 - 243.

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