Page 181 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER EIGHT

Austro-Hungarians protect their communications by “conventional number and letter or specific
ciphers”, as confirmed by questioning some prisoners .
97
On such a basis, the Technical Office of the Supreme Command suggested that the telephone
interception station in Batognica remain operational with the only purpose to intercept the enemy’s
telephone messages. This principle rapidly extended to all Armies.
On 15 October 1915, a circular letter signed by General Porro requested that all circuits in the
area where interception occurred be replaced by metallic circuits, while leaving unmodified the
previous ones used to transmit “fake news” only. Taking for granted that the Austro-Hungarians
were listening Italian telephone conversations, the circular letter reads:

please do not use mixed circuit to transmit correspondence in the areas where the phenomenon
in question occurred or might occur (listening to Austrian telephone conversations, A/N). […]
Completely metallic circuit should be used […] and moreover, telephone interception stations
that have intercepted enemy phonograms must continue to operate exclusively as intelligence
tools and to perform active correspondence as in ordinary circumstances, though they must
exclusively transmit and receive from the other friendly stations fake military news that seems
true .
98
In the following months, apparently truthful news found large diffusion on the Isonzo front, as
witnessed by the correspondence between Italian Headquarters. It can be mentioned as an example
the 3 Army Intelligence Office transmission “by the station in Selz of seven phonograms that
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were all intercepted by an enemy station where they made a considerable impression”, so much
so that they were immediately transmitted to the Headquarters.
The same communication by the 3 Army mentions other phonograms with spurious news
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transmitted by the stations of Polazzo and San Michele, in the night between 5 and 6 March, which
were not intercepted “probably because personnel in charge at the enemy station was asleep”. They
were submitted again the morning after. After a few days, the movements of enemy troops proved
the complete success of ‘our game’ .
99
The text of a conference delivered presumably in February 1918 at a “Course on combat conduct”
by an Austrian Staff Officer - who was an Informer of the 58 Division Headquarters - provides
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a vivid description of some episodes regarding the first telephone interception operations. As to
the Austrian-Hungarian telephone eavesdropping service, according to the same officer, “perhaps
nothing else has been more praised and at the same time more blamed than this invention.
Often, the station would only intercept our communications, or the enemy would transmit false
communications knowing these were being intercepted”. After mentioning some successful results
achieved in the Carso region in the winter of 1915-1916, he adds: “The Italians also made fun of our
conventional names at times, which led us to infer that they were intercepting our communications
too. Finally, complete attack plans could be intercepted; yet the attacks would take place in other
locations, clearly showing that those orders were just imaginary” .
100

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97 Headquarters of the 2 Army, Communication to the Intelligence Office of the Supreme Headquarters, Fonogrammi di fonte
austriaca intercettati (Intercept Austrian phonograms), ref. no. 725 of 9 October 1915.
98 Supreme Headquarters, Office of Chief of Staff, Circular letter, Ref. no. 4985, 15 October 1915.
99 Intelligence Office of 3 Army, Phonograms to the Supreme Command, 6 and 10 March 1916, Historical Archives, Army
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General Staff AUSSME, Series E8, env. 8.
100 Supreme Headquarters, Daily News, Un giudizio nemico sul vario rendimento del servizio d’intercettazione telefonica
(Enemy assessment about random performance of the telephone interception service), no. 231 of 3 October 1918, part 4,
miscellaneous news. The Italian had seized this document during the Second Battle of the Piave River.

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