Page 177 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)
P. 177

CHAPTER EIGHT




                  rotate the pedals of a bike plugged into a dynamo, similarly to the 200Watt Italian station that
                  became operational the following year .
                                                     78
                  Since 1915, radio-goniometric surveys and listening operations provide important information
                  also on German and Turkish transmitters within the wider European and Middle Eastern context .
                                                                                                         79
                  However, while the Central Powers extensively used long-distance radio communications for
                  lack  of alternative means,  on the  Italian front, the Austrian commands  soon prohibited  radio
                  correspondence, as they had already done on the Russian front, with the only exception of emergency
                  cases . Consequently, the number of intercepted dispatches in this field dropped significantly.
                       80

                  The cryPTologIc sITuaTIon aT The end of 1915

                  The  radiotelegraphic  interception  services  as  well  as  the  direction-finding  and  the  technical
                  control in the theatre of operations, including the activities carried out by the radiotelegraphic
                  Office of Codroipo, directly reported to the Chief Inspector of the Military Telegraphic Service,
                  in compliance with the directives issued by the Chief of the Army Staff .
                                                                                    81
                  Conversely, the fragmented organization assigning to different bodies the responsibility concerning
                  the management of each code and cipher, resulted to be one main drawback affecting the Italian
                  Cryptography.
                  In fact, the Red Code was on charge of the Ministry of War and related deliveries issued by the
                  Minister’s Cabinet Office. The key words and other provisions concerning the Pocket Military
                  Cipher - also published by the Ministry of War - were managed by the Supreme Command.
                  Finally, the responsibility of the Service Ciphers pertained to the Chief Inspector of the Military
                  Telegraphic Service . The lack of adequate skills within all these organizations contributed to the
                                    82
                  first Austro Hungarian cryptologic successes.
                  However, the main cause of the Italian dispatches decryption in 1915 may be ascribed, as already
                  mentioned, to the partial encoding, in addition to the weakness and longevity of codes and ciphers.
                  The decision of abolishing the partial coding on 6 August , arrived too late because that procedure
                                                                      83
                  - along with the seizure of instructions - had in fact already helped break Service Cipher based on
                  groups of figures. Therefore, the five key changes applied during 1915 proved to be ineffective
                  for increasing its resistance to decryption. On the contrary, the service order introducing the use





                             st
                  78  HQ of the 1 Army, Disposizione Stazioni austriache, (Position of Austrian stations), ISCAG, Coll. 235. The stations
                  identified by the Austrian with progressive numbers from 1 to more than 20, were supposedly deployed opposite the Italian
                   st
                  1  Army at: the Stelvio Pass, the Tonale Pass, in Lardaro, Mount Brione, Rovereto, Folgaria, Caldonazzo and Lavarone;
                  opposite the 4 Army at: Costalunga Pass, Maone, Col di Lana, Forte Dossaccio, Col Rondella, Cima Bocche, in addition to
                            th
                  two stations in Puster Valley. Fewer stations were located on the Isonzo front.
                  79  The report of the Codroipo Radiotelegraphic Office of January 1916 that will be discussed in the following chapter refers
                  to the results achieved in the final months of the previous year.
                  80  M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op cit., p.4.
                  81  Italian Army, Office of Chief of Staff, Technical Office, Confidential circular letter, ref. no. 4020 of 20 September 1915,
                  Subject: Organization and employment of radiotelegraphic service, ISCAG, Coll. 220.
                  82   The  Chief  Inspector’s  staff  included  an  Officer  expert  in  the  technical  aspects  of  the  service,  particularly  in  radio
                  communications, with the task also of generating Service ciphers and related keys. During the entire war period, the two
                  Engineer Corps Officers responsible of this task - Ugo Levi first and Cesare Bardeloni later - were excellent radio technicians
                  but evidently had no special aptitude for cryptography. Bardeloni replaced Levi when colonel Gaetano Cadorna replaced
                  colonel Natalino Mazzone as Chief Inspector of STM, in March 1917.
                  83  Chief Inspector of the STM, Military History Journal, Service Order N°19, 6 August 1915, AUSSME, Series B1, 105 S,
                  Vol. 87. The previous provisions issued on 30 May were discontinued. It became mandatory to encode completely the text,
                  the address and the signature of any radio dispatch, excepting the abbreviation identifying transmitting and receiving stations.


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