Page 192 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

know, for example, that Cristofolini was admitted in May 1917. By mentioning them in his book,
probably Sacco wanted to recall those who contributed the most to the unit’s work thanks to their
special cryptologic aptitude, what may be defined a good ‘cipher brain’.
Moreover, amongst his co-workers, Sacco mentions engineer Franco Magni as “chief of radio-
interceptors and goniometer operators” who had succeeded him as chief of Codroipo office, after
his secondment to Rome at the end of October 1916 . Until that moment, Sacco had been filling a
33
double position, as he had been organizing radio interception and traffic analysis on the one hand
and decrypting enemy dispatches on the other. He signed monthly reports on radiotelegraphic
activities throughout 1916.
Tangible results regarding the breaking of German and Austrian codes and ciphers did not take long
to show, together with the concrete - yet initially unsuccessful - attempts to have an impact on the
nature and usage of the Italian army codes and ciphers. Before describing the initial outcomes of
Sacco’s generous efforts, it seems appropriate to illustrate some competitive advantages obtained
during war operations by the commitment of the opponents in the radio intelligence domain.

9.3 THE GREAT BATTLES OF 1916

The sTrafexPedITIon
On 15 May, the Austrian attack named Strafexpedition (punitive expedition) or Battle of the
Plateaux took place, with the aim of breaking through the Trentino front and invade the Po Valley.
It is worth to recall that at the time of this battle, Italian Communication Intelligence and Security
still had lower standards than those achieved by the Austro-Hungarian army. In fact, the ability
to decrypt enemy radio dispatches was just emerging and telephone interception was not yet
extensively used in the area controlled by the 1 Army where the attack took place, unlike what
st
had happened in other sectors of the front line. Therefore, timely news regarding the attack had
reached the Intelligence Offices of the Supreme Command and of the 1 Army through Human
st
Intelligence traditional channels.
During the first phase of the battle, most of Italian troops’ wire connections were destroyed
by artillery fire and only radio could “guarantee the most important communications”, though
“following the withdrawal of our front line, some of the radiotelegraphic stations were compelled
to discontinue their service” .
34
Under these circumstances, the Italian frequent radio transmissions allowed Austro-Hungarian
Headquarters to obtain some important operational information by decrypting Italian dispatches.
According to Figl, instructions imprudently communicated via radio between 19 and 20 May by
the Headquarters of the 1 Army allowed contrasting effectively an Italian counter-offensive .
35
st
In early June, the interception of stations with new names made Austrian commands aware of
existence in the area surrounding Padua of newly established 5 Army created to support worn
th

33 Franco Magni was a brilliant inventor. Sacco called him Captain, a rank he perhaps achieved after the war. In fact, during
the war he remained Lieutenant.
34 Those stations recovered or destroyed their equipment before retreating. Supreme Command, General Inspectorate of
the Engineer Corps, Relazione sulle attività delle Specialità Telegrafiche nella recente guerra (Report on the Activities of
Telegraphic Specialized Units during the last war), p. 19, ISCAG, Coll. 226.
35 O.J. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas Figl, op. cit., p. 145. That dispatch comprised many operational details and was evidently
addressed to subordinate units, infringing the prohibition to transmit this kind information especially top-down the military
hierarchy.

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