Page 193 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER NINE

out troops deployed on the Tridentine front . The map in picture 9.4 shows the location of the
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new stations along with the entire deployment of Italian radio stations as of 8 June. However,
since the Austrians did not yet have direction finding equipment, they could only detect a general
increase in traffic and the existence of new radio stations. Consequently, Ronge’s statement that
the reinforcement troops had assembled near Padua could have been derived from other sources
of information, or in hindsight, as it seems to be supported by a reference made by the Austrian
General to “the exact data given by Cadorna and Tosti concerning the forces deployed by Italy,
that we now have” .
37
The cryptographic countermeasures adopted by the Italians also included the change of the service
cipher key only for the 1 Army and the adoption of a “special cipher” to transmit news collected
st
by reconnaissance aircrafts. The Austro-Hungarian commands interpreted such measures as a sign
of an imminent counterattack .
38
At the end of the battle, the Imperial army withdrawal led it to positions slightly forward with
respect to the beginning of the offensive that “had burned out as a firework, with a thousand
flares but no substance” . Ronge, neglecting the Italian army’s strong resistance, explained the
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final retreat with a radical change in the force balance between the two armies and with the “new
war events on the Russian front” which “imposed a limit to our offensive, so glorious until that
moment” .
40
From a cryptologic point of view, in late spring of 1916 and, above all, during the Strafexpedition,
the Austro-Hungarian cryptologic service detected the introduction of new Italian ciphers that
succeeded one another in a short time and with key daily changes, in accordance with what
prerviously shown about the C2 cipher. Ronge admitted: “the remarkable improvement of their
encoding capacity is a reason of concern and generates a suspicion about the Italians having possibly
surmised the existence of our listening service” . Figl also agreed that the Italian commands had
41
become especially aware about the danger inherent in the employment of radio communications
and the scarce effectiveness of the protections systems adopted until that moment .
42

The role of coMInT In The conquesT of gorIzIa
The scenario of cryptologic competition radically changed during the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo,
which took place between 4 and 17 August and led to the conquest of Gorizia. This time the
Italian radiotelegraphic stations could maintain complete radio silence before the attack, since all
communications were conveyed by wire, making it possible to conceal any information including
those concerning the redeployment of troops from the Tridentine to the Isonzo front.
Figl does not apparently devote any space to the Sixth Battle of the Isonzo, probably due to the
lack of obtained information. Conversely, Ronge points out the “harshly negative judgement of
the command of the Austro-Hungarian 5 Army regarding the interception and decryption service,
th
justified by total surprise of the Italian Army’s attack against Gorizia” .
43

36 ibidem, p.146.
37 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit. p. 234.
38 O.J. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas Figl, op. cit., p.146 -148.
39 ibidem.
40 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit. p. 234.
41 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op cit., p. 9.
42 O.J. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas Figl, op. cit., p.149.
43 M. Ronge, Der Radio Horch, op. cit., p.9. The 5 Austrian army deployed along the lower Isonzo had countered the Italian
th
attack to conquer Gorizia.

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