Page 230 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

In October, the 3 Army conducted tests to assess
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the Gorizia amplifier performance compared to that
of French-made equipment . French amplifiers
85
were then used along with the ‘Gorizia’ ones. When
the Gorizia valve became no longer available,
the Telephone interception office modified the
detector-amplifier adapting it to French valves .
86
Between late 1916 and early 1917, the availability
of valve amplifiers allowed a more widespread I.T.
service, also in the sector of the front controlled
by the 1 Army, where telephone eavesdropping
st
activities had been previously limited, due to the
actual difficulty in developing an intercepting
network on the mountains .
87

10.15 The “Gorizia” amplifier (ISCAG Archive)

soMe relevanT resulTs In 1916
Since the early months of war, Austro-Hungarian Headquarters had issued directives aimed to
avoid disclosing to the enemy useful information by inappropriate telephone conversations and
to instruct telephonists about the employment of concealed languages for escaping any enemy
interpretation. However, these simple languages generally adopted to codifying only the words
carrying the most important information did not apparently lead to meaningful results. A rough
codification referred for to beverages, a much-desired item for soldiers on the front, establishing
for instance a correspondence respectively between “large barrels” and cannon; “small barrel” and
machine gun; “cask” or “tub” and mortar, with calibres expressed in hectolitres .
88
With some practice, the Italians managed to understand the meaning of those simple concealed
words. Of course, for those who lacked that kind of expertise developed through a painstaking
interception activity, the terms used by the Austro-Hungarians could seem harmless and/or
unintelligible. This is what happened to a young interpreter officer just arrived on the front, who,
after his first listening shift during the night, on the following morning said to the commander
of the telephone interception station that he had nothing to report because the Austrians had just
talked about “chocolate”, “sugar” and “coffee” .
89
Since early 1916, the Chief Inspector of the STM received several reports on the results achieved
within the 2 and 3 Armies. For example, the listening stations set up by the 3 Telegraphic
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nd
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85 Chief Inspector of the Military Telegraphic, Journal, Circular Letter to the Headquarters, op. cit.
86 Italian Marconi Company had purchased the plant in Novi Ligure and stopped the manufacture of valves. Therefore, French
valves were imported at a larger extent beeing, throughout the war, those mostly available. By the end of the war, imported
valves amounted to 1.500 per month.
87 Tests in the first Army started in March 1916, gave only partially convincing results, as shown in the correspondence
between the Headquarters of Engineer Corps of the Armies and the Supreme Headquarters. Cesare Pettorelli Lalattta, in
I.T.O. Note di un Capo del Servizio d’Informazioni d’Armata (Operating Troops Intelligence Notes of a Chief of the Army
Intelligence Service), Agnelli, Milano 1934, p. 135 -137 dates the beginning of systematic interception on this front-line back
to March 1917, but other archive information suggests that they might have taken place a few months earlier.
88 A. Petho, op. cit., note 203, p.217.
89 Mario Nordio, Nel cinquantenario della Vittoria. Il telefono in trincea, Selezionando SIP, n° 6, Roma, 1968, pp.16-17.

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