Page 227 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TEN

implemented by single units . Obviously, this does not rule out dangers for security due to the use
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of rotating grilles or of other locally produced weak ciphers and therefore the need to monitor and
eventually remove those ciphers by a team of expert cryptologists working at the central level. This
finally happened in 1918, when the Cryptographic Unit issued clear and binding rules to guarantee
the security of ciphers created at local level.

The effecTIveness of Penkala

At the end of 1916, Italian cryptographic defence was still affected by many shortcomings
that enormously facilitated Austrian analysts’ work. Sacco’s suggestions to design more
robust ciphers than the existing ones were followed slowly and reluctantly. Consequently,
due to internal aversion to change, red-tape delays and personal conflict, the replacement
process was long and difficult and lasted throghout 1917 and part of 1918.
Austrian analysts, taking advantage of this situation, extended their interception and
decryption network that became especially effective on the Tridentine front during the severe
winter period, when many wire connections broke down and the Italians were compelled
to use the radio, in some cases also for confidential dispatches. At the end of 1916, several
Penkalas were operating on the Italian front, while on the Italian side just one centre of

excellence was active and comprised a little more than ten personnel .
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With reference to the effectiveness of decryption, in terms of actual information gathered
through it, Figl and Ronge highlighted, as already mentioned, the successes obtained during
the Strafexpedition. Conversely, the situation on the Isonzo front seemed to be quite different.
In fact, extreme caution in transmitting via radio non-confidential news only, made the
Austro-Hungarians’ great efforts to intercept and decrypt scarcely fruitful. This seemed to
be the main reason for the mentioned sharp comments given, after the loss of Gorizia, by the
Headquarters of the 5 Army regarding the decryption service.
th
Moreover, discussing the 7 , 8 and 9 Battles of the Isonzo between September and
th
th
th
November of 1916, Ronge himself ascribes to sources other than radio interceptions the
gathering of news that could prevent the Italian attacks from being a surprise, as on the
contrary it had happened before the 6 Battle, due to shortcomings of the Intelligence Service
th
as a whole, including Penkala .
74

72 O. J. Horak, Oberst a.D. Andreas Figl, op. cit., p. 148.
73 The Penkalas mentioned by Ronge were in Bolzano, Trento, Villach, Adelsberg, Cattaro, Pola and Castelnuovo.
74 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op cit., p.10.

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