Page 236 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

the second radiogram including a single question in French: “What’s new in Athens?” . The same
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letter provides information on radio communications between the Central Empires and Greece and
particularly on two German stations codenamed WF and MU located in Macedonia and connected
with those of Sofia and Athens. The communications were “interrupted when the Allies took
control of the Greek Post and Telegraphs Offices and restored during the night between 5 and 6
December after the uprising in Athens”.
The same source reports that, on 7 January, a new Greek station named RSP located near Larissa
began the transmission, in place of that in Athens, using a new cipher . Hence, German station
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sending the dispatches was one of the two codenamed WF or MU, while the receiver coincided
with the new RSP. The locality indicated with L in the German dispatch would, therefore, be
Larissa.
A few days earlier, “a telegram from Emperor William to his sister the Queen of Greece had
been intercepted and decrypted by the British. It announced that Falkenhayn would be ready to
reach Larissa on call” . It is therefore likely that Falkenhayn’s journey was related to the German
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attempts to support the notoriously pro-German Greek royal family and to oppose the independent,
pro-Entente Government of Thessaloniki led by Venizelos, giving the journey itself and therefore
the radiograms decrypted by Sacco a political value.
As far as the cryptologic aspects are concerned, the Section’s logs report notices about several German
radiograms decrypted over this timeframe. For example, on 5 December 1916, the logs read, “Sent
four radiograms in German field code to the Italian military mission in France (8 others already sent
yesterday); 4 additional radiograms to the same mission and to the British one in France”.
By then, after the progress already made in Codroipo, Sacco could decrypt the German field
dispatches with simple or double transposition with or without a key, as confirmed by the Manual
where he stated: “remarkable results have been obtained against the German ciphers with simple
and double transposition [...]. This group includes the cryptogram mentioned by General Marchetti
[...] and related to General Falkenhayn’s journey to Greece (January 1917)” . However, we know
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that since 7 January, Larissa station had adopted a new cipher which probably was the same of the
intercepted radiograms. It could justify the two or three days taken to decrypt them.
As mentioned before, the cryptanalysis of German dispatches continued, at least for the whole
month of January 1917, with different types of ciphers, obtaining information mainly concerning
German troops and movements of German officers between Germany and Turkey .
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InTercePTIons and radIo sTaTIons localIsaTIon
After the separation of the Cryptographic Unit from the ‘Codroipo Radiotelegraphic Detachment’,
the latter continued to feed Sacco and his collaborators with the results of their listening and
goniometric activities promptly. In March 1917, the receiving stations dedicated exclusively
to listening to enemy radio communications were supported by at least ten fixed transmitting

12 Intelligence Service, Section R, Comunicazioni RT austro – tedesche con la Grecia, (Austro-German RT Communications
with Greece) addressed to Section U, 12 January 1917, AUSSME, Series E2, Env.66.
13 ibidem. The news about the installation of the “Elassora (North of Larissa) transceiver system by German officers with the
help of Greek realists”, appeared a few days earlier in the newspapers of Thessaloniki, confirming the location of this station.
14 ibidem. These facts dispelled Garruccio’s doubt that Colonel Falkenausen, former German military attaché in Athens, was
the author of the message.
15 L, Sacco, Manuale, op. cit., p.309.
16 Intelligence Service, Section R, Radiotelegrammi decifrati, (Decripted radio telegrams), ISCAG, Coll. 223.

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