Page 261 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Due to the limited range, the high probability of interception, and the high sensitivity to noise, the
geo-telegraphy technology did not survive WWI. In 1919, its application in French army became
limited to backup other communication systems , while the Italian army saw it as a subsidiary to
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trench radio telegraphy.

11.6 THE FIGHT FOR TELEPHONE INTERCEPTION

I.T. servIce enhanceMenTs
Each Italian Army progressively created its network of listening stations in their areas of the front,
and implemented stations and wire infrastructures varying as a function of the proximity to enemy
trenches, the nature of the ground, etc. The ground sockets were installed as close as possible to
enemy trenches: a not easy tasks, especially when the trenches were on the opposite bank of a
river or on far away mountain.
Nevertheless, also thanks to many heroic actions remained often unknown, the number of telephone
interception stations increased considerably: on the eve of the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, more
than 60 installations were active, mainly equipped with valve amplifiers .
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I.T. centres were set up to organise and coordinate four or more listening stations and to ‘filter’
the information gathered. The most important pieces of information were immediately forwarded
to line Commands and the Intelligence Services of the Armies, also known as Informazione
Truppe Operanti, or ITO (Operational Units Intelligence Office). In areas with fewer telephone
interception stations, only one Centro Raccoglitore Stazioni Intercettatrici, or CRSI (Centre for
Telephone interception Stations) was active. The network of the 2 Army in August 1917 included
nd
six I.T. centres, each assigned to an area of the front, as shown in picture 11.20.
From early 1917, in parallel with the quantitative increase, several measures were adopted to
improve the quality of service in terms of interceptions ‘range’ and of conversations interpretation.
To contrast the countermeasures adopted by the Austrian Headquarters within a continuous
competitive escalation, the I.T. Service devoted great care both to personnel training and to
interception tools improving .
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For instance, until October 1917, the Telephone interception laboratory of the 2 Army trained
nd
“about 40 officers (centre masters, station chiefs, interpreters) and 300 personnel from other
ranks” . For standardization purpose, a layout of a ‘model telephone interception station’ was
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adopted, as shown in picture 11.21, where the switching board placed in the top centre and two
Gorizia-type amplifiers may be easily noticed .
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Against the constant danger of Austro-Hungarian interceptions, an ‘active counter-interception’ was
immediately activated in response to the detection of enemy telephone eavesdropping activities,
disturbing them by the current of usual telephone voice calling devices or rather by frequency

85 Cours d’officiers-élèves de l’Ecole Spéciale Militaire - 1919, T. P. S. Fonctionnement et Règles de service, Paragraphe 14.
86 The figures in the text are taken from the articles written by A. Carletti and G. Guasco.
87 Among other things, acoustic isolation was installed in the listening booths, portable soundproof booths were designed
for temporary forward installations, and the equipment used by the teams in charge of laying interception lines - i.e., copper
ground plates, drum backpack, spade, etc. - was improved
88 A. Carletti, op. cit., p.18.
89 Up to 14 separate external lines could be connected to the input panel of the switch board, each with its own grounding.
They could be also coupled to form 7 listening circuits.

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