Page 265 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Great Battles of 1917 on the Italian Front

12.1 THE ELEVENTH ISONZO BATTLE

crITIcIsM abouT The Penkala

At the end of June 1917, in the Italian army about 110 field radio stations were deployed across
the entire front (picture 12.1) . In particular, the network of the 2 Army included 23 transceivers,
1
nd
almost half of which having a transmitting power of 200 Watt or less, to ensure communication
within the Army and beyond . The other Italian armies were equipped with a similar number of
2
radio stations, while the Supreme Command had three radio stations, in addition to a backup and
a listening stations.
The eavesdropping Austrian system, strengthened thanks to the layout of many listening stations,
was equipped to exploit the large Italian traffic, intercepting for instance the same cryptogram
even five or six times.
However, during the careful planning of the Eleventh Battle of Isonzo - the Italian offensive started
on 17 August 1917, that led to conquering the Bainsizza Plateau and Monte Santo - the Italian
operational dispatches were transmitted across physical lines or communication means other than
radio, the latter being used only for news of marginal importance. Therefore, the Austrian stations
intercepted a large amount of encrypted radio messages, but Penkalas could extract no useful
information from them to foresee the imminent Italian offensive .
3
As already mentioned, General Boroevic, heading the Isonzo Armies where the breach occurred,
requested after the end of the battle, to suspend all the interception and cryptanalysis activities,
which he considered unproductive .The Headquarters of the 5 Army had made the same proposal
4
th
at the end of the Battle of Gorizia in 2016.
Although Ronge thought this request as originated from a simple ‘dislike’ between Headquarters, it
is understandable that such a radical position taken by Boroevic, a highly respected General known
as the ‘Lion of the Isonzo’, may have caused some concerns in the higher ranks of the Austro-
Hungarian army. However, as the previous request, it did not generate any practical effects. Ronge
wrote in his memoirs that the Austrian Supreme Command responded with a brief note boasting
the usefulness of the Penkalas service. Moreover, it mentioned three cases - just three cases in
the eleven battles on the Isonzo front - when the interception of Italian dispatches had brought
operative intelligence results. Curiously, one of those cases concerned the “grouping of the 2
nd

1 ISCAG, Coll. 238.
2 The Army Headquarters in Cividale is linked to the Supreme Headquarters via radio, to the Headquarters of the other
Armies and the depending Corps and Divisions Headquarters, as well as to other locations that can hardly be reached with
other means.
3 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., p.27. Across the front, the Austrians intercepted several hundred messages per month,
with different content. For example, until 23 October 1917, the Penkala in Margburg processed slightly more than 200 Italian
messages (M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., p.23).
4 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., p. 21.

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