Page 267 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

InforMaTIon froM TelePhone InTercePTIons
On the other hand, the Italians collected by telephone eavesdropping some relevant news about the
resistance and the counteroffensive the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters were organising. A bulletin
of the 3 Army based on interceptions carried out between 21 and 31 July included information on
rd
the meticulous enemy preparation, the equipment stored in caves, the extent of troops, the sectors
they had occupied, and so on. The bulletin dated 2 August, reads: “After detecting intense traffic
on our lines of communication, the enemy seems extremely nervous. From all the intercepted
messages we deduce he expects us to act very soon”.
In effect, the increase of the Italian wire traffic detected by the Austro-Hungarian listening stations,
informed their Commands about the preparation of the Italian offensive, even without providing
specific information about its planning.
When the battle started, on 18 August, the Italians intercepted a large amount of telephone
conversations and, according to Ronge, they (the Italians N/A) “became furious when the Austrian
intercepted dispatches revealed their telephonists were chatting at the beginning of the attack” .
7
The Italians were not, in fact, immune from the habit of talking too much and incorrectly on the
phone.
During the battle, the interception network of the 2 Army followed all phases of the fighting, almost
nd
as if conversations were directly heard inside the Austrian trenches. On 28 August, a dramatic talk
took place like this: “Captain, Sir, we can’t shoot because everything here is destroyed, nor can
we go out because a forward enemy post is almost on us”; “hear hear, Lieutenant, can’t you find a
way out?”; “hear hear, Captain, Sir, [...] we are buried like in a foxhole here” .
8
And on the same day, another telephone interception station captured the following message: “the
Italians must have spies who inform them constantly. Their bombs hit the very entrance of every
shelter […] this front now is worse than Gorizia’s one” .
9
As the Italian troops advanced, two eavesdropping stations also moved forward, and new ones
were installed on the plateaus . Those stations learned that “the enemy intended to withdraw
10
from Monte Santo 12 hours before it occurred, and had been planned some limited actions against
our most forward lines, actions that every times failed as soon as they started” . In particular, at
11
1.42 pm on 23 August, the Italian listening stations intercepted a telephone call from the Austrian
position at 615 m on the Monte Santo that read: “wait for the Brigade’s orders before abandoning
the position. Move artillery pieces to rear positions …” .
12
The telephone interception reports issued by the Intelligence Office of the Headquarters of the 2
nd
Army in the second half of September and in early October - during the battle for the control of
the deep and narrow Chiapovano Valley - revealed what was happening among the enemy units .
13
On 6 October, while Austro-Hungarian artillery and infantry units prepared to fight on the eve of
the counter-offensive, an Austrian Lieutenant stated: “we can never be vigilant enough. The enemy

7 M. Ronge, Les Maitres, op. cit., p.218.
8 Ibidem., p. 219-220.
9 Ibidem.
10 IT Cabinet, 2 Army, Relazione sugli impianti di stazioni intercettatrici eseguiti dal 15 agosto al 30 settembre (Report on
nd
new interception stations plants carried out from 15 August and 30 September), Lieutenant Carletti, Head of Team, ISCAG,
Coll. 222.
11 ibidem. The news about the enemy leaving the position came from the eavesdropping station on the Monte Santo at altitude
615.
12 M. Ronge, Les Maitres, op. cit., p.218-219.
13 Aurio Carletti, Il servizio della intercettazione delle comunicazioni telefoniche nemiche sull’Isonzo nel 1917, Postal,
Telephone, and Telegraph Services Digest, no. 12, December 1915, p. 794-797.

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