Page 269 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

his troops encountered lousy weather and active resistance by Italian forces on the first day of the
battle, he wrote:

My request for telegraphic (radio) stations to issue orders to forward command posts during
operations was never met […]; bad weather had disrupted all wireless lines in a short time,
and we had no connections. We received no updates from forward units, nor could the Corps
Headquarters send reports to the Army Headquarters or Marburg .
20

Then, to stress the lack of radio communications once again, he added:

The Germans had wireless stations within all Divisions; therefore, they were always, at least,
connected .
21
General Otto von Below also said in his memories that the 1 Austrian Division under his command
st
“lacked light machine guns, radio stations, and horses” . The Chief of Staff of the same Army,
22
General Konrad Krafft von Delmessingen, confirmed the deficiency of radio equipment for
communications between Austro-Hungarian units in the book he wrote about some of the events
analysed here .
23
On the contrary, the Germans were equipped with wireless systems having different powers
and size, suitable to ensure communications also within Divisions. For example, the ‘Tactical
Instructions for the 12 German Division’, protagonist of the quick movement toward Caporetto,
th
stated:

Among the divisional radiotelegraphic units, the station 316 will be deployed at Ravna within
the divisional tactical Headquarters. The large radiotelegraphic equipment will move together
with the divisional staff. The 24 Infantry Brigade will receive a medium-size telegraphic
th
device. The 63 Infantry Regiment will receive a medium-size telegraphic device. The 62
rd
nd
and the 23 , a small-size telegraphic device .
rd
24
On the contrary, in the Austrian army, the Corps and Division Commanders did not enjoy the luxury
of a radio station. Because of a constant fear of Italian interception and decryption, the Austrians
even during the planning of a large movement of their troops, when the front was expected to shift
until to the Tagliamento River, continued to rely only on interceptions and to limit radio emissions
drastically, hence accepting significant operational limitations.

20 The entire sentence appeared in Alfred Krauss’ report: Lo sfondamento di Plezzo, settembre - novembre 1917, Italian
version, AUSSME, Series E12, env.127 and in Alfred Krauss’ book, Le cause della nostra disfatta, Itinere Progetti, Bassano
del Grappa, 2014, p. 193. In our text, the word ‘radio’ was included in brackets before ‘telegraphic’ as the context made it
self-evident.
21 ibid., Artillery fire had destroyed the Italian telegraphic and telephone lines, or the withdrawing units severed them. The
weather, on the other hand, had knocked down the improvised telephone lines to connect German and Austrian units.
22 F. Fadini, Otto von Below, op. cit., p. 242.
23 Konrad Krafft von Delmessingen: 1917 Lo sfondamento dell’Isonzo, Mursia, 1981, p.111, 213, 280.
nd
24 12 Infantry Division, Istruzioni speciali n° 245, Ott.1917, in HQ, 2 Army, Intelligence Section, Notizie sull’avanzata
th
austro- tedesca dall’Isonzo al Piave (News on the Austro - German move from Isonzo to the Piave river), p.49, AUSSME
Series H4, env.28.

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