Page 271 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

this area . However, the moving of seven Infantry brigades to the Tyrol front, avowed by Ronge,
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cannot be demonstrated on the basis of the available documentation.

The TelePhone dIsPaTch announcIng The aTTack
According to the listening stations reports of the 2 Army, the interception efforts continued
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through the months of September and October . Ronge acknowledges that during the Austro-
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German planning for the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, “some interesting pieces of information about
our planned offensive were collected (from the Italians, A/N) through telephone interception” .
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Since the end of September, concrete hints demonstrated the preparation of a massive attack
by a large force massed around Bovec and Tolmino. Between the 3 and the 10 October,
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conversations were heard that announced the presence of German batteries and troops coming
from the Western front, and of new Austro-Hungarian contingents previously deployed in
Russia or in Trentino. The frequency of conversations including news on the German support,
and the talks among German Officers clearly showed how significant the German presence
was, also in terms of the size of troops. The Austrian and German units stationing around
Plezzo and Tolmino “had just arrived at the front. Perhaps they were unaware of the stringent
regulations on telephone communications. They talked thoughtlessly and seamlessly over the
phone, to the point that communications from the divisional and Corps’ Headquarters were
also intercepted” .
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At 11 am of 23 October, the radio station in Sleme intercepted the orders to attack, issued by
the 14 Austro-Hungarian Army. The content of “the telephone message reached all the Italian
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involved Headquarters about 12 hours before destruction fire” revealing that the gas attack would
begin at 02.00 hours during the night between the 23 and the 24 of October .
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Without recalling here the debate on information provided to the Supreme Command by the
Intelligence Service on the eve of the Battle of Caporetto, it is demonstrated that many Italian
telephone intercepting stations provided precise and detailed information on Austro-German
planning, from the first days of October until immediately before the attack when the German
soldiers exchanged words of encouragement like ‘Hurra!’ and ‘Deutschland über Alles!’.

12.3 THE EFFECTS ON THE ITALIAN RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

The sTaTIons dePloyMenT
Besides the shortcomings discussed later, the Italian radio stations served almost all divisional
Headquarters and, in some cases, Brigade Headquarters and Artillery Groups. The radio network
of the 2 Army, which the 14 Austro-German Army attacked on the night between the 23 and
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24 of October, included 28 field radio stations of different transmitting power, and the fixed
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30 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p. 312.
31 A. Carletti, Il servizio della intercettazione, op. cit., Year 7, No. 10, December 1936, p. 516 - 524.
32 M. Ronge, Les Maitres, op. cit., p. 220.
33 Ibidem. Some aspects of planning were also evident, such as the restoration of the bridge in Tolmino, and the availability
of new offensive weaponry, such as hand grenades whose power was unknown at the time.
34 Headquarters, Corps of Engineers of the 8 Army, Relazione sulle Intercettazioni, op. cit., p.13.
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