Page 276 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

12.4 FROM THE ISONZO TO THE PIAVE

The “sPIanTI” of ITalIan radIo sTaTIons

Between 25 and 28 October, most of the remaining radio network of the 2 Army were progressively
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dismantled. Enemy artillery fire had destroyed only two of those stations, hence confirming their
high degree of survivability while the operators dismantled most of the others, including the
permanent 3 kW installation in Osoppo, pending the lack of suitable transportation means. The
telegraph operators of the 2 Army units that could retreat orderly, frequently managed to save
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codes and other confidential documents, but moving portable or coffer-stored equipment to the
collection centre in Codroipo had only been possible in a limited number of cases.
The 1.5 KW truck-mounted radio station located in Cormons that served the Army Headquarters was
miraculously saved and reactivated in Poscia, near Pordenone, where the Headquarters and the associated
radiotelegraphic Section had found temporary shelter before reaching their destination in Este. From 28
October to the end of the month, no other radio station within the 2 Army operated any transmission.
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Ronge described the dramatic situation of Italian radio communications with intense satisfaction: “as
soon as a radio station was forced to leave a position, it was required to send a telegram saying ‘spianto’
(end of operation activity, N/A). Then it transmitted again on the new position further down, trying to
establish communication with its Headquarters, but our offensive pushed it back even more […]” 48
In real terms, in addition to the two mentioned redeployments of the Cormons Station of the 2
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Army mentioned above, all the stations of the 3 Army, which began their retreat on 27 October,
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moved orderly toward the Trasimeno, than to the Piave Rivers without transmitting anything along
the way. Only the 1.5 kW field stations assigned to the Army Headquarters and to the 13 , 8 , and
th
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23 Corps, during the ten days required for the redeployment across the Piave River, made little
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use of radio communications, in fact no more than three times each .
49
To ensure communications among other Headquarters during retreat, the Telegraphic Companies
made enormous efforts to adapt the state-owned or private wired networks to the needs of the
Army, as described in the reports of the Armies’ Telegraphic Service Inspectorates.

InTercePTIng ITalIan radIo dIsPaTches
During the dramatic first days of the battle, General Badoglio was not alone in misusing radio, since
other dispatches with requests for backup or statements of powerlessness due to the lack of weapons,
ammunition, etc. have been broadcasted and intercepted by the Austro and German stations . During
50
the first attack, then some ‘spianto’ messages and radio-goniometric detections may have provided
useful information on the Italian lines of retreat. Moreover, Ronge mentioned only a successful radio
interception by the 10 Austrian army which achieved “an idea of the intentions of Italian Headquarters
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and of the movements and grouping of troops in Carnia”, exploiting this knowledge for operational
purposes .
51

48 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, p. 313.
49 Third Radio-Telegraphic Section of the Army, Copia del Diario Storico Militare, dal 26 ottobre 1917 al 28 febbraio 1818
(Copy of military log, 26 October 1917- 28 February 1918), War Zone, 28 February 1918; Relazione sulla sistemazione delle
comunicazioni radiotelegrafiche durante il ripiegamento dal Carso al Piave, (Report on RT communication arrangement
during the retreat from Carso to Piave), ISCAG, Coll. 242.
50 O.J. Horak, Oberst a. D, Andreas Figl, op. cit., p 191.
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51 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., p, 26. Allegedly, the 10 Austrian Army became aware of the order issued to the troops
deployed along the Upper Tagliamento to retreat from the Forcella - Losco - Medina line and of the situation in the Cadore

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