Page 275 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

There were most likely some exaggerations in the story told by von Below. Given the time required to
repair the antenna, redeploy to a new position, and install the equipment and antenna again, no more
than two redeployments could have occurred while the station was operational, that is, from Kosi to
Kambresco, and then to Liga. As a matter of fact, according to the report of the 2 radiotelegraphic
nd
Section, the station was “abandoned and destroyed at 17.00 after it remained operational until 13.00,
although the antenna had been hit repeatedly by grenades. Only the codes and two coffers with devices
were salvaged” .
44
In conclusion, it can be inferred that one of the reasons Badoglio ‘wandered’ in the morning of the 24
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would be his attempt to protect the radio station from enemy artillery shells, since it remained the only
available means for trying to contact the depending units and the Headquarters, 2 Army in Cividale.
nd
Considering the events, in the dramatic moments when the front was broken, people may have
made serious mistakes, also in radio transmission without, for instance, taking any precautions
to prevent enemy localisation and interceptions. However, the story told by von Below proved
Badoglio and his staff had little awareness of the risks associated with radio emissions and were
completely ignorant about the appropriate countermeasures to avoid the enemy tracking success .
45
Quite perplexing is also Badoglio’s testimony before the Commission of enquiry, where he stated
he had agreed with the Army Inspector for Telegraphy on 9 October to “install a radiotelegraphic
station at every command post of the depending Divisions and at the Corps’ new location in Kosi.
With more time available, the programme would have been implemented in full” .
46
The Badoglio request really included the implementation of a new station in Kosi, but he had made
up for it by moving Mount Ostrykraz’s equipment and antenna to that location. The suspicion then
arose that the General pretended to demonstrate the absence of a radio station while being in Kosi
on 24 October, in the attempt to hide his misadventure.
On the contrary, special mention should be made of the heroic resistance of the Monte Santo
station. “Until the last moment - caught in a fierce struggle and under relentless enemy artillery fire
- it maintained close connections with the radiotelegraphic stations of other Headquarters, and the
artillery observatory of Dragovice. Lastly, it only talked to the stations of the Supreme Command
(Udine) and waited for the order to withdraw when all the other radiotelegraphic stations, even those
in the deep rear, had already removed” . Once the Supreme Command issued the order, the station
47
ceased operations in the afternoon of 26 October. Its personnel escaped the encirclement bringing
the equipment that was destroyed and abandoned later along the way due to the lack of adequate
means of transport.

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44 Radio-Telegraphic Section of the 2 Army, I movimenti op. cit., p.1 - 2. The two coffers obviously contained the transmitting
and receiving equipment of the 200W station. In the report there is no indication of the reason for the ultimate station failure.
45 Apparently, this station transmitted even plaintext messages. Sending encoded, short messages at large intervals of time
could have prevented the enemy radio goniometers from pinpointing the position of the sending station, an activity that
required some minutes.
46 Commission of enquiry on the Battle of Caporetto, Excerpt from the Badoglio Report, Offensiva nemica dell’ottobre e
contropreparazione per parte del XXVII Corpo, (October enemy attack and 27 Corp counter preparation), AUSSME, Series
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H4, env.65.
47 Inspectorate General, STM, Relazione Tecnica sul Servizio radiotelegrafico dell’Esercito, op. cit., p. 18, ISCAG, Coll. 242.

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