Page 274 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)
P. 274

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)




              In fact, the violent bombing brought on early 24 October had no disrupting effects on the greater
              part of the Army wireless stations. Among those assigned to the 27  Corps, only the station of
                                                                             th
              the 19  Division on Mount Jeza was hit and destroyed, while the Headquarters station stopped
                    th
              working in the afternoon. The 65  Division station in Siroka Njiva remained operational until the
                                            th
              morning of 25 October when the telegraphists destroyed all the equipment to avoid enemy capture.
              Concerning the 4  Corps stations, over the first day of combat, the only active stations installed
                              th
              at Smast and Srpenica assigned to the 46  and 50  Divisions respectively, were also destroyed by
                                                   th
                                                           th
              their staff. The installation in Potoki assigned to the Corps Headquarters, not yet operational, was
              “quickly disassembled and sent to the rear, while antennas were abandoned due to the quick turn
              of events. The Corps Headquarters had already redeployed without issuing orders” . The radio
                                                                                           38
              station assigned to the 43  Division and being installed in Dretzka disappeared without a trace,
                                      rd
              possibly because the enemy captured it .
                                                  39
              The other 22 radio stations of the 2  Army continually worked during 24 October. The statement
                                               nd
              of the Commission of enquiry on the battle of Caporetto saying that the “scarce radiotelegraphic
              communications” had been interrupted by the first bombing of enemy artillery was therefore incorrect .
                                                                                                     40
              On the other hand, Figl dedicated significant portions of his memories to what he believed was odd radio
              silence on the Italian part throughout 24 October and Ronge, probably relying as in many other cases on
              the information contained in Figl’s Cryptographic Memories, recalled the “silence of the Italian radios”
              on that day and the “spianto” (end of operation activity) of same Italian stations on the next day .
                                                                                                41


              IncoMPeTence and heroIsM
              Based on the memoirs of Colonel Cannoniere, Commander of the Artillery Forces of the 27  Corps and
                                                                                             th
              other testimonies, the radio installation assigned to the Corps Headquarters was initially installed on
              mount Ostrykraz and it followed the Commanding Officer, General Badoglio, as he moved to Kosi on
              22 October, lefting a receiver behind .
                                              42
              On 24 October, Badoglio redeployed again the Headquarters to the Kambresco Caves - the Headquarters
              winter location - and then to Liga. Dispatch riders and Officers of subordinate units travelled back and
              forth in a frantic attempt to get orders from their Headquarters.
              According to von Below, the position of the radiotelegraphic station in Kosi and its services for the
              Headquarters, 27  Corps had been discovered two days before the attack, that is, just after they had
                             th
              moved to Kosi. The artillery units of the 14  Austro-German Army targeted it from the beginning of
                                                     th
              24 October, hence forcing the station and the Headquarters it was assigned “to move from location to
              location”. When artillery fire damaged the antenna, the station was promptly repaired and relocated,
              together with the Headquarters, to preserve them from incoming fire. Found by radio goniometers and
              targeted again, it “started wandering, was hit again, broadcasting messages about its impossibility to
              exercise command” .
                               43



              38  Second Radio-telegraphic Section of the Army, I movimenti delle Stazioni radiotelegrafiche dal 24 al 31 ottobre, (RT station
              displacements from 25 until 31 October), ISCAG, Coll. 235.
              39  Ibid.
              40  Commission’s report, op. cit., p. 224.
              41  M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op cit., p. 23; O.J. Horak, Oberst a. D, Andreas Figl, op. cit., p 189 - 192.
                                  th
              42  Artillery Headquarters, 27  Corps, Memoria al Comando Artiglieria della II Armata, a firma del Colonnello Cannoniere,
              (Memorandum of 2  Army Artillery Headquarters signed by Colonel Cannoniere) 31 January 1919, AUSSME, Series H4,
                            nd
              env.28.
              43  The story that Von Below allegedly told appears in F. Fadini’s book Caporetto, op. cit., p. 183-184. The incident was
              confirmed by some other sources mentioned in the book.


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