Page 277 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

No other specific reference to dispatches successfully decrypted during the Twelfth Battle of
the Isonzo and the following Italian retreat can be found in the memories of Ronge and Figl,
while German sources added some data achieved alo by traffic analysis. General Krafft reports
the interpretation of some Italian dispatches starting on 31 October, when the “dismantling of
radio stations from Trentino to Cortina d’Ampezzo” announced the retreat of the 4 Army from
th
the Dolomites. It was a clear sign the Italians wanted to “make the Piave River their new line of
defence and signalled that the defence of the Tagliamento river - in fact quite vivid here and there
- served the only purpose of covering the general withdrawal” .
52
On the 2 of November, the installation in Pordenone of a radiotelegraphic station assigned to the
nd
3 Italian Army and the radio messages about the arrival of 100.000 French soldiers “suggested that
rd
the enemy (i.e., the Italians, A/N) intended to establish a strong position along the Tagliamento” .
53
On the next day, the Headquarters, the 14 Army received a summary of some dispatches showing
th
that the Italians wanted to maintain their position along the Tagliamento, and northbound, along
the Degano Creek, up to the front in Trentino”. However, at that time, the information was not
anymore up to date, since “no longer consistent with the events” .
54
The afore-mentioned messages suggested different hypotheses about General Cadorna’s intentions
and demonstrated the difficulty to deduce reliable information from radio interceptions. At times,
it also depended on a certain degree of prudence the Italian commands had in using radios to issue
operational orders, despite the severe conditions of the retreat.

coMMunIcaTIon Issues wIThIn The ausTrIan arMy
During displacement from the Isonzo to the Piave, the Armies of the Central Empires faced
considerable difficulties in laying wired connections as quickly as required by the speed of advance
and moreover the Italians systematically sabotaged the physical lines, so that in most cases their
prompt repair turned out to be almost impossible in occupied territory. While German Divisions
coped with this lack by means of radio communications, Ronge himself admitted that the shortage
of adequate transportation means within telegraphic units - in fact, a must for establishing timely
wire connections - had caused severe shortfalls in communications, which in turn caused “explicit
blames by the German Command against the Austro-Hungarian army” . The few Austrian radio
55
stations, whose emissions the Italians had intercepted and pinpointed, were definitely insufficient
to provide adequate service. Perhaps some of those stations even violated the orders issued by high
commands on the use of radio emissions.
The lack of an efficient telecommunications system in the Austro-Hungarian army was considered
the cause of several inconveniences, such that occurred when the German and Austrian divisions
“crossed paths”, with consequent delays in their movement to reach the bridges over the Tagliamento
river, before the Italians could blow them up . Actually, if the 2 Austro-Hungarian Army moved
56
nd
- or had allowed the Germans to move - southbound, they would have probably crossed the retreat

area around Comelico - Agordino, which may have led to the capture of several Italian prisoners.
52 K. Krafft, op. cit., p. 233 -.234.
53 ibid., p.258.
54 ibid., p. 263.
55 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., p. 26.
56 Christian Ortner, Caporetto, International conference on “Sacro egoismo” o “fellonia senza pari”? Austria e Italia nella
Prima guerra mondiale, (“Sacred selfishness” or “unparalleled felony”? Austria and Italy in the WWI), 27 - 29 May 2015,
Österreichisches Historisches Institut, Rome.

275