Page 278 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

path of the Italian 3 Army and blocked its way to the Tagliamento, thus dooming it to destruction
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and inflicting a deathly blow onto the Italian army .
57
General Krafft suggested as a cause for this failed outflanking attempt the scarce flexibility of
Austrian Headquarters and the long delay along the Austro-Hungarian communication channels,
stating that “their high commands remained far behind and issued orders one after another. Once
received, however, those orders were no longer consistent with the situation on the field” .
58
The communications anomalies caused adverse effects also on interception and cryptanalysis efforts, as
the Austrian sources admitted delays up to 36 hours in the transmission to the Penkalas of the dispatches
intercepted by the listening station because, in some cases, telegrams were delivered by hand to the
nearest telephone post and relayed to the decryption service only after a long wait .
59
When referring to the planning, a few months later, of the Second Battle of the Piave river, Ronge
recognised that “all precautions had been taken to avoid deadlocks to operations, as it had been the case
during the Battle of Caporetto”, where ‘deadlock’ probably meant the disruption of communications .
60
However, when the results of the offensive, such as the one that began on 24 October, go beyond
all expectations, it is understandable that the problems encountered could be judged as secondary
and attributed to intrinsic faults of telecommunications systems, contrary to what had happened
after the defeat of the Austro-Hungarians in Gorizia and on the Bainsizza Plateau.

The faTe of The radIo gonIoMeTrIc secTIon
During the critical retreat from the Isonzo to the Piave, the interception and localisation activities
of the 1 radio-goniometric Section never ceased, except in the three days needed for the
st
“adventurous” transfer from Codroipo to Arcella (Padua), which started on 28 October, and in the
few days required to redeploy equipment. In this eventful situation, the telegraphists of the Section
“managed to salvage almost all their equipment and those from other telegraphic sections, which
had established a temporary detachment in Codroipo” .
61
The Italian Intelligence Service showed strong concerns for the destiny of the radio-goniometric
Section when the delivery of intercepted enemy dispatches stopped for some days. On 29 October,
the Chief of Section U asked the Inspectorate of STM that “the radiotelegraphic station formerly
located in Codroipo - wherever it was - should transmit the intercepted enemy dispatches to
Section R by means of the conventional alphabet adopted since last January” .
62
Further evidence of the importance of the job carried out by the Section and the other eavesdropping
radio stations lies in the telegram sent to Section U by Chief of the Intelligence Services, Colonel
Marchetti who underlined the need to continue and even intensify “the listening activity through
the radiotelegraphic stations in Treviso, Verona, Padua, and the station previously located in
Codroipo”, and invited them to send the intercepted enemy dispatches to Section R by telegraph .
63

57 K. Krafft, op. cit., p.232 - 237; A. Krauss, op. cit., p.196.
58 K. Krafft, op. cit., p. 280. Krafft wrote, for example, that if General Boroevic had to be informed on the presence of German
units in Latisana - i.e., the destination of the right wing of the 2 Austrian Army - he would have probably changed his orders
nd
(ibid., p. 233).
59 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., p. 26. Other issues emerged for organisational reasons, such as the loss of intercepting
stations, or the lack of synchronisation between the movement of personnel and equipment.
60 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op.cit., p. 342.
rd
st
61 3 Telegraph Regiment, 1 Direction Finding Section, Relazione sull’operato, op. cit. p.3.
,
62 Section U, Intelligence Service, Comunicazione urgente (Urgent communication), Prot.n. 14006/S, 29 October 1917 , ISCAG Coll. 223.
63 Section U log, Copia di telegramma in arrivo del 30 ottobre 1917, (Copy of telegram arrived on 30 October 1917), ibid.
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