Page 268 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

is listening, but how can we not speak? We see and hear the movements of troops. If the Italians
realise it, we are ruined, Colonel” .
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12.2 PLANNING THE TWELFTH BATTLE OF THE ISONZO

The ausTrIan PreParaTIon

Figl and Ronge described the offensive organization in every detail, including the assignment
of the Penkala AOK XIV, under the command of an Austrian officer, to the Headquarters of the
14 Austro–German army, which would have launched the main attack against the Italian lines.
th
This Penkala comprised personnel from both Armies and relied on two German and two Austrian
interception stations . Two others Penkalas were deployed across the Isonzo front, in addition to
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Marburg’s Penkala, with about thirty listening stations .
16
After being summoned, on 7 October, by Emperor Charles - who was “extremely interested in
the planning” - Ronge reached the front, where he inspected the stations and remained until the
attack took place “to verify that the radiotelegraphic stations would provide a faultless service” .
17
Of course, the Ronge attention focussed on systems he believed useful to collect intelligence
rather than on the radios needed to communicate between units, a matter for which he was not
responsible.
Despite the large number of assets deployed, Ronge stated that radio communications listening
before the battle had yielded no practical results. Figl also wrote he found no helpful suggestions
to understand how much the Italians knew about the plans of attack or to grasp information about
their countermeasures .
18
On the contrary, the Commander of the 14 Army, General von Below, mentioned in his memories,
th
as a positive outcomes achieved by radio interception, the new that “the enemy, advised by that
scoundrel Maxim the Rumanian, had sent backup forces to the planned targets of the attack,
namely the Matajur and the Xum” . However, despite some sporadic news, we can eventually
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infer that radio interception brought little operational advantage to the Austro-German forces on
the eve of the Twelfth Battle of the Isonzo, because of radio silence generally respected by the
Italian station and of an incomplete knowledge of the Italian codes, as shown below.
As far as radio communications within the Austro-Hungarian army are concerned, Italian
interceptions resumed in October 1917 detecting an increase of enemy traffic before the attack,
mainly generated by German stations.
In fact, the greater part of Austrian combat units was not equipped with radio communication
:
devices, as attested by several testimonies as for instance by General Alfred Krauss, the Commander
of the Austrian Corp belonging to the 14 Army, tasked with attacking Italian troops in the Plezzo
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(Bovec) Basin. In referring to the unsuccessful efforts around Mount Rombon and Vrsic, where

14 ibid.
15 O.J. Horak, Oberst a.D, Andreas Figl, op. cit., p.189. The Commander of Penkala AOK XIV was Captain Karl Kovacevic.
16 M. Ronge, Der Radiohorch, op. cit., Annex 34.
17 M. Ronge, Spionaggio, op. cit., p.312 - 313.
18 O.J. Horak, Oberst a. D, Andreas Figl, op. cit., p. 147.
19 Francesco Fadini, Otto von Below, Caporetto dalla parte del vincitore, Il Generale Otto von Below e il suo diario inedito,
Mursia, 1992, p. 241. The book is based on unpublished papers of the German General. Lieutenant Maxim was a deserter.
He revealed the plans of the attack to the Italians.

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