Page 289 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER TWELVE

consider that the information in those reports was only a small portion of those intercepted,
we can have an idea of the considerable number of phonograms we collected .
93
The number of interceptions could be even larger if one considers the conditions of a large part
of these bulletins when the Austrian Intelligence Service found them because, as Ronge stated,
many had been partially or totally burned, and some others had been submerged in water to make
them unreadable.
It seems the Austrians became fully aware of the quantitative and qualitative importance of Italian
interceptions only when they recovered the above-mentioned documents. It is surprising to note
that until November 1917, despite the ‘permeability’ of the front mainly due to the information
obtained from interrogations of prisoners and deserters, the Italians were able to keep a partial
secret on their initiatives in this sector.
The merit of creating this secrecy curtain is largely due to the telegraphists and interpreters of the
Telephone interception Service. In this regard, the head of the I.T.O. Office (Intelligence Office) of
the 1 Army stated, “the entire staff is subject to strict discipline, [...] that makes keeping secrets a
st
habit. And never ever - this is the greatest pride that always moved me - has any of those humble
men ever betrayed his duty of office throughout the war” .
94

ausTrIan aTTeMPTs To sToP The InforMaTIon flow
The interrogation of prisoners and several captured documents showed that the Austro-Hungarian
Headquarters were aware the Italians intercepting capability of their telephone communication
nearly from the beginning of the war. For instance, some documents captured by the Italians
contained information achieved by Austro-Hungarians through interrogation of prisoners about
“a practical telephone and radio interception courses held in Vicenza and attended by Officers.”
The same sources referred to successful Italian telephone eavesdropping activities “in spite of all
the orders we had issued” .
95
These pieces of information, together with others, confirmed the countermeasures the Austro-
Hungarian Headquarters repeatedly ordered to assume, using for instance conventional codes and
languages of the Empire other than German . However, the documents captured by the Italians
96
also seem demonstrate the view of the Austrian Headquarters ascribing to the correct procedures
in telephone installation and maintenance an efficacy at least comparable with the protection of
content of the dispatches.
Instead, the security of message contents should enjoy larger care than that of communication
links, especially on the front, where the minimum technical requirements concerning the telephone
circuits electrical isolation, balance, etc. achieved in normal circumstances could not be granted
always.
We do not know how many intercepted telephone communications, out of 10,000 mentioned in the
document in picture 12.6, had been encoded. However, from the results of the Italian interceptions
we can infer that a large part of them was in clear words or protected by a simple concealed language,
so that the Italian note accompanying the above-mentioned document can assert: “since the enemy

93 A. Carletti, Il Servizio delle intercettazioni telefoniche, op. cit., p. 23.
94 C. Pettorelli Lalatta, op. cit., p.137.
nd
95 Information Office, Headquarters 2 Army, Traduzione di documenti di comandi nemici riguardanti il pericolo delle
intercettazioni telefoniche (Translation of enemy Headquarters documents concerning Telephone interception dangers),
Bulletin no. 2268, 16 September 1917. The Austrian HQ, 62 Infantry Division issued this document on 15 August 1916.
nd
96 ibid.

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