Page 49 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER THREE

The end of a peace epoch

3.1 INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICE

The careful aTTITude durIng The PreParaTIon of The lIbyan war

The interest of the intelligence services towards Tripolitania and Cyrenaica dated as far back as at
least 1883 when, after the French invasion of Tunisia, the Chief of the Army Staff, General Enrico
Cosenz, ordered Captain Carini of the General Staff Corps to draft an in-depth analysis of those
North African territories. The Carini report, in addition to a description of the Libyan territories,
included comments on the military preparation of the Turks and warned about the possible danger
of an Arab revolt in case of an Italian invasion. According to this paper, “the Arabs could side
with the Turks against the aggression of a Christian country. The sect of Senussi (the Jesuits of
Islam) is a powerful moral force that deserves careful attention. […] In Cyrenaica, the Senussi
have several Zaniè, which are schools, cloisters, and extremist centres at the same time, especially
against Christianity” .
1
The Colonial Office restated those warnings in October 1911, when the Italian landing in Tripoli
was imminent, by writing:

We cannot close our eyes and believe in the intel that often comes from Tripolitania. This
information, which seems too optimistic about the feelings that the Arabs of Tripolitania have
for us, comes from informers who almost belong to the Banco di Roma, which is interested
in forcing us to war and represents it as a quite easy option. This Office believes imprudent
to rely on the help of the Senussi and the Arab tribes, while it would be suggestible to take
precautions against their possible alliance with the Turkish troops .
2
The well-disposed or at least neutral attitude the Arab peoples allegedly had toward the Italian
occupation was therefore an incorrect tale that circulated in the political and diplomatic environment,
whose members acted - probably in bad faith - in order to urge the national government to undertake
a war in Libya . However, the Chief of the Army Staff and the General Caneva, head of the
3
expedition, failed to pay attention to the information of the Colonial Office, as they preferred to
rely on those provided by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, wrongly assuming the Arabs had a favourable attitude towards the Italian occupation.

1 Captain Alfonso Carini’s report, 1883, AUSSME, L-8 Libia Series, env.6.
2 Operations Division - Colonial Office, Memorandum no. 1296, 1 September 1911, Informazioni circa una eventuale
spedizione in Tripolitania e Cirenaica (Information about a possible expedition against Tripolitania and Cyrenaica), AUSSME,
L-8 Series, env.128.
3 Incorrectly, SIFAR emphasized the mistake made by the intelligence service while preparing the war in Libya: “Unfortunately,
the euphoric expectations in the autumn of 1911 disappointed everybody, without distinction, when faced with the unexpected
hostile and proud attitude of the Arabs […]. It was undoubtedly a mistake” (SIFAR, Il servizio informazioni militare italiano
dalla sua costituzione alla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale, op. cit., pp. 8-9).

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