Page 54 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

Redl’s activities were notorious, but he had not been unmasked yet. Therefore, the Minister of
foreign affairs was compelled to implement a lenient policy, even toward Montenegro” .
13
The betrayal of Redl caused significant internal and international consequences. After searching
Colonel Redl’s house and office, the Austrian intelligence services admitted that “the State suffered
huge moral and material damage that cannot be quantified in numbers. […] A wave of snide and
indignant remarks and suspicious insinuations overwhelmed the Army. In Galicia, a serious hunt
for officers was provoked by anonymous agents and in Hungary, a campaign against Vienna and
the General Staff arose” .
14
This historical event, which inspired several movies, provoked a great deal of interest in the
press all over Europe, causing great scandal and embarrassing the Double Monarchy. The Italian
military attaché in Vienna described the event as follows:

This case caused great sensation. Probably exaggerate rumours are circulating about possible
accomplices who are under suspicion or at the verge of standing trial. To have a clear idea of
the disgust and astonishment caused by this fact, we must consider that the General Staff was
largely esteemed here. […] Redl was regarded as an officer with a great future and General
Conrad trusted him completely. He held the position of deputy chief of the General Staff’s
Evidenzbureau, which is seen here as the most important post .
15

InforMaTIon sources abroad
In the early 1900s, the intelligence activities conducted abroad, previously almost unknown even
to military leaders, finally lost their long-standing shroud of secrecy and acquired their own dignity
within the Headquarters of the General Staff Corps, rising to the level of other activities such as
war plans, operations, logistics, etc.
The inclusion of the Intelligence activities among the subjects taught in the Official’ training schools, as
a part of military arts, confirms this approach. The subject was also mentioned in the synopsis used by
the trainees who attended the courses, where the information sources that could be deployed abroad even
in peacetime are specified together with their degree of reliability and efficiency:

Military attachés assigned to the embassies are not a significant source of information since
they cannot collect confidential information due to their delicate position. Italians abroad can
sometimes provide information, but the largest part of them are poorly skilled and therefore
inaccurate. […] The government employees, especially who carry out police services at the
border could help, but their field of action and skills are limited. Well-paid foreign citizens
could sometimes provide useful news, but given their doubtful morals, it is generally better
to distrust them. [...] Emissaries, i.e., individuals sent on a mission abroad, may guarantee
success in peacetime, especially if they are selected with wisdom. [...] The press is another

13 Memorandum of 9 January 1914, La politica estera austro-ungarica in una conferenza del conte Sternberg (Austro-
Hungarian Foreign policy at a Conference by Count Stenberg), Eastern Theatre, AUSSME, G-22 Series.
14 Albert Pethö, op. cit., p. 249, 252.
15 Report no.58/140, dated 31 May 1913, Military attaché to the Royal Embassy of Italy in Vienna, Spionaggio Redl, AUSSME,
G-22 Series, The Redl affair had further consequences and led to the dismissal of Colonel Augusto Urbanski, chief of the
Austrian intelligence service.

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