Page 50 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

On the imminence of the landing, Captain Pietro Verri was sent to Tripoli under cover as a postal
service officer with the task of organising a local Intelligence Service. He arrived in Tripoli on 21
September 1911 and started to send several dispatches to Rome until he died on the battlefield on
26 October 1911.
In December of that year, a Politico-Military Office was created in Libya with purpose of carrying
out intelligence activities, monitoring against enemy espionage, negotiating with tribes’ leaders,
establishing relations with native peoples and setting up an indigenous militia .
4
The Intelligence Service section of the Politico-Military Office established a network of military
informers from troops’ commands up to regiment level, who in turn engaged indigenous emissaries
to obtain information from “local inhabitants, especially in markets and cafés, from soldiers and
from people arriving from the outside, in occasion of parades, operations, etc.” 5
General Tommaso Salsa, head of the Office, provided the guidelines for the relations with local
tribes’ leaders, and “informed the troops’ commands about the policy established by the Governor
specifying how soldiers had to behave with locals.” The Politico-Military Office was also
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authorised to entrust reconnaissance missions to military aviators and aerostat pilots.

The redl affaIr
Between 1910 and 1913, thanks to an exemplary espionage operation, Italy obtained confidential
documents belonging to the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, including General Conrad’s war
plans of 1909. The documents firstly received in December 1910 included 23 photographs of a
report containing various war plans of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the related deployment
of forces. It was translated in the same month and reproduced in eight copies (see picture 3.1) .
7
After the documents check-up, the Intelligence Office avowed their authenticity, as per following
statements: “I examined the documents carefully and ordered an officer to do the same. We are
both convinced that these are photographs of authentic and recent draft documents. […] The
enclosed documents show such a degree of reliability that may become a useful starting point for
studying the Austrian war gathering (against Italy N/A), in the case that all European countries,
except Serbia and Montenegro, remain neutral (as predicted by Conrad in his famous memoir).” 8
This success, overlooked until today, can be regarded as the most important of the Italian military
Intelligence Service in the first years of the new century , and was due to Colonel Alfred Redl,
9
former deputy chief of the Evidenzbureau, who betrayed his Country by selling the most secret
documents of the Vienna General Staff to Russia, France, and Italy. Redl, an Official highly
esteemed within the Austrian military entourage because of his presumed moral integrity and

4 Military Political Office, Relazione sulla campagna di Libia, ottobre 1911 - agosto 1912 (Report on the Lybia campaign,
October 1911- August 1912). Memoria 6ª, AUSSME, L-8, env.132.
5 Circular no.123, 27 December 1911, Norme per i signori ufficiali informatori (Rules for informing Officers), AUSSME,
L-8 Series, env.134.
6 Agenda no.47, 16 December 1911, AUSSME, L-8 Series, env.128.
7 The copies were distributed as follows: one to the King, one to the Chief of the Army Staff, two to the Eastern Theatres and
four to the designated Headquarters of the Armies.
8 Intelligence Office, Memorandum no.14, 12 January 1911, Specchi di radunata della I e II armata dell’esercito austro-
ungarico (Gathering schemes of the 1 and the 2 Austro-Hungarian Army), AUSSME, G-22 Series.
st
nd
9 Odoardo Marchetti mentions the Redl affair in a few lines (p. 23, op. cit.) without giving it the consideration it deserves.
Gatti seemed to have a better knowledge of the facts. He interviewed General Garruccio who said, “In 1912 we had the luck
to get our hand on Colonel Redl from the Austrian General Staff, a debt-ridden homosexual who provided us with lots of
documents. He was perfectly correct with us and received at most 60,000 kronen. […]. He gave us documents about the
Austrian mobilisation”, (Angelo Gatti, Caporetto. Dal diario di guerra inedito - maggio-dicembre 1917, il Mulino, Bologna,
1964, p. 159).

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