Page 60 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

However, Cadorna did not hesitate to entrust the Intelligence Office with significant tasks. With
the purpose of enhancing the war plan against Austria-Hungary he asked the Office, in August/
September 1914, to gather and select information useful to identify the positioning and movements
of the higher echelons and units of the Habsburg Army, namely to “extend its tentacles towards the
enemy troops” for discovering “where they can be redeployed and sent against us”. To this end,
the movements of the troops had to be detected by informers located along the main railway lines
and in the places of arrival and gathering of troops .
32
Following those instructions, the Intelligence Office started to rebuild with the greatest possible
accuracy, the deployment of the Austro-Hungarian Army on the Eastern, Balkan, and Italian fronts.
In the fear that German troops could join Austro-Hungarian forces on the Italian front, the
monitoring was extended to the Germany territory, especially to its southern borders, with the
purpose of discovering any movement of troops and materials towards the Alps front. The Eastern
Theatre decided to control Western Galicia/Silesia/Moravia, the Tyrolese/Bavarian border, and
the Austrian/Serbian/Montenegrin border as well as the most important railway junctions, such
as Vienna and Budapest for arrivals from Galicia; Munich for arrivals from Bavaria; and Bosna
Brod for arrivals from Serbia. Informers located in the stations of arrival and gathering of troops,
began to create a vast intelligence network.
Moreover, in January 1915, Cadorna gave the Intelligence Service the mission of hatching a
complex plot aimed at distracting the Austro-Hungarian attention from the organisation of the
main Italian action on the Isonzo front .
33

InTellIgence neTworks In ausTrIa-hungary

In Trentino, Venezia Giulia and Istria operational intelligence networks made up of ‘unredeemed’
people have been already implemented. The agents from Trentino reported to centres located
in Milan, Brescia, Verona, and Rome and those from Venezia Giulia and Istria to centres in
Pontebba, Udine and Venice. The intelligence activities were rather fruitful until late 1914, thanks
to the frequent desertion of Italians returning from other theatres of war, while afterword a better
monitoring of the borders by the Austrian Gendarmery led to the reduction in their number. On the
other hand, it turned out to be appropriate leaving good informers within the Empire where they
continued to conduct intelligence activities from the beginning of war.
On the other hand, the creation of a network of informers in Tyrol and Puster Valley resulted extremely
problematic, because of the inhabitants’ proverbial loyalty to the Habsburg Monarchy. It was less difficult
to find informers in the region of the middle course of the Sava, delimited by Klagenfurt/Ljubljana/
Agram and Graz, because of the Slovenians dislike against the Double Monarchy. In the centre of the
Empire, particularly in Wien, recruiters tried to find potential informers among Italians who lived there,
especially students, and among Jews and women who were easy to bribe.

32 Information Office, Norme per la raccolta, op. cit.
33 Office of the Chief of Army Staff, Memorandum of 18 January 1915, Provvedimenti per ingannare l’avversario circa le
nostre intenzioni nell’eventualità di una guerra a Nord Est (Measures to deceive the enemy about our plans, in case of a war
on the North East fronline), AUSSME, F4 Series.

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