Page 62 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

THE SECRET WAR ON THE ITALIAN FRONT IN WWI (1915 – 1918)

problems, the Intelligence Office established offices or agencies in neutral territories, which acted
as intermediaries, handling correspondence to and from the enemy country and collecting news
from the local press as well as information provided by emissaries. In particular, “two offices”
were arranged in Switzerland, “to collect and send mail. They employed a captain from the
reserve living in St. Gall as well as an Italian living in Lucerne, who already cooperated with the
Intelligence Office”. Another Office in Zurich, “engaged a person who also analysed German and
Swiss newspapers and monitored the possible actions taken by the Germans against us and the
position of Switzerland in such cases” .
36
The creation of an Intelligence Centre in the Netherlands was also planned, under the direction of
Alessio Chapperon, a General of the reserve who had “already shown his exceptional abilities in
this field during the Turco-Italian war in Tunis and could communicate with us through an office
located in London”.
An Intelligence Centre established in London at the beginning of the war, was suppressed after
three months “due to scarce performance and excessive requests for money”. In the intention of the
Intelligence Office, this centre could be re-established “when Italy will enter the war and British
and French authorities probably stop obstructing the passage of Italian mail”, also to act as a liaison
for the correspondence from the Dutch office.

The crIsIs In early 1915
Despite the efforts made by the Intelligence Office, the overall results of the activities carried
out, in the months preceding the start of the war, for improving intelligence inside the Austro-
Hungarian domain, were not fully satisfactory. In fact, the Office found difficulties in creating a
well-organised and far-reaching intelligence network, in recruiting and instructing informers and,
above all, in infiltrating agents in Austria and Germany, which were already involved in the war
and therefore monitored their territories carefully. An Office memorandum reads:

The closing of the frontiers, the monitoring in particular of Italians and Slavs, the strict
measures against possible espionage activities, the rigorous censorship on postal and
telegraphic communications, the recruitment in the Army of all Italians aged 20-42 years,
even those barely fit for military service, and their deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Galicia, the threatened expulsion from border areas and the internment in concentration camps
of people who are more or less under suspicion are all factors that make it extremely difficult
to find informers who, either for personal profit reasons or patriotism, are willing to take such
serious risks .
37
The Trentino area was well ‘covered’ , while problems in Southern Tyrol and in the areas
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surrounding the Isonzo River were encountered due to ethnic groups who demonstrated hostile
and hindered every italian intelligence activity.
Cadorna understood the seriousness of the situation, highlighted the poor knowledge about the
enemy defences located a few kilometres from the Italian border, and urged the Army Intelligence
to improve its performance, stating that:

36 For all news in this paragraph, see: Intelligence Office, Memorandum no.2, 4 January 1915, AUSSME, E-2 Series, env.122.
37 Memorandum no.2, January 1915, Intelligence Office, op. cit.
38 For information about tThe networks organized implemented in Trentino by the Verona and Brescia Centers are also
described in: Tullio Marchetti, Ventotto Anni nel Servizio Informazioni Militari (Esercito), Trento, 1960, pp.59-64.

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