Page 63 - The Secret War in the Italian front in WWI (1915-1918)

CHAPTER THREE

the Eastern Theatre provided me with information about the current deployment of Austro-
Hungarian troops in the regions of the 2 and 14 Corps and about the defensive works
nd
th
between the rivers Isonzo and Sava. However, despite some sound deductions and the good
intentions, it is impossible to know with certainty what is going on near our borders. […]
Therefore, it is necessary to immediately strengthen the intelligence service for achieving sure
results as soon as possible .
39
Under these circumstances, Colonel Poggi asked for additional officers since his Office was
overloaded due to the ever-increasing expansion of the service. He complained, for instance,
the lack of resources to manage “the continuous relations with the Public Security Direction, the
Ministries of Finance, of Foreign Affairs and Interior Affairs […]” .
40

3.4 CADORNA’S REORGANISATION

Measures Taken In The IMMInence of The war
For supporting the Intelligence Office, in March-April 1915, some ‘detached’ offices were
established near the front in Lombardy-Venetia with the task of creating and managing information
networks beyond the borders, assuring their unity of action and purpose.
The detached offices strengthened their networks of informers in the enemy countries and thanks
to their activity, the information lack on the enemy Army was fixed, to some extent. As expected,
the best results were achieved by exploiting the pro-Italian feelings of most people from Trentino,
where the most famous intelligence structure, managed by Tullio Marchetti, was flanked by other
active and effective organisations, such as the one headed by General Florenzio Aliprindi who
wrote:

Dealing with intelligence activities, I reached quite satisfactory results. I had the opportunity
to contact refugees from Trentino who provided me with daily information about the enemy
defences. […] Before the start of the war, I could make a confidential report aimed at facilitating
the orientation of the troops, when deployed beyond the border. I remember I succeeded in
obtaining some tables showing the trenches and the interruptions prepared by the enemy .
41

Even General Max Ronge said that before Italy entered the war, “our (Austrian A/N) counterespionage
service achieved only few results, while the Italian Intelligence Service worked at full pace”, also
thanks to about 20,000 ‘unredeemed’ people from Tyrol, who fled to Italy, and to deserters from
the Gendarmerie .
42

39 Office of the Chief of the Army Staff, Memorandum no. 38, 3 January 1915, AUSSME, E-2 Series, env.122.
40 Intelligence Office, Memorandum of 23 March 1915, AUSSME, F-4 Series, env.49. In addition, Poggi asked for new funds
after obtaining an additional check amounting to 4,000 liras per month until March 1915 included.
41 Commissione d’Inchiesta su Caporetto, Trascrizione della deposizione del Generale Aliprindi, AUSSME, H-4 Series,
env.25.
42 Max Ronge, Les Maitres de l’espionnage, Payot, Paris, 1935, p. 161 -162.

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