Page 320 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

286 \'l'IUIAM N STIU, JR
Ordinancc stores for Amcrican vessds had tO be shipped from rhc Unired Scatcs
wirh the e.xceprion of depth charges. In conrrast w che A.E.F .. American warships
werc armcd with American weapons. The deprh chargcs inirially placed on Amcri·
can warships wcre coo small and wcre replaced b)• rhe rype uscd by rhe Royal Navy.
Thc adoption of the Nonh Sea mine barrage concept creared major lògistical
problems for the U.S. Navy. Two bases were establishcd in Scorland, tcn mine lay-
ers based rhcre a long wirh shore pcrsonncl, and by rhe end of rhe war. more than
50000 mines had been laid by British and American mine layc:rs. A sccond mine
barrage tO be laid across rhc Adriatic Sca was never implemenred.
The availabiliry of food and even drinking waccr was a serious problem. Fresh
provisions when available were purchascd locally. In some arcas such as lreland
and France, vcgccablcs, eggs, and daicy producrs were generaUy obrainable. In En-
gland and Scotland, howevcr, thesc producrs were rationed nnd not rcadily :waila-
ble in adcquacc arnounrs. Mcar was cxrremcly scarcc in ali the Allic:d councries and
refrigcra10r ships had 10 be cmployecl tO supply American forces. By Sep1ember,
1918, America n ships were 1mnsponing so m~ rhrcc co four mìllion cons of frozen
mt:at momhly. <9l Dry scores such ns flour, sug~tr. ccreals, ere., aJso lmcl co b~: bronght
in by miVal Cltrgo ships from rhe Unitecl Scaces.
The Nn val Overscas 1'ransportntion Servicc (NOTSl was heavily ta)Ctd ro sup·
por1 Amcricnn nu.val forccs in Europcu.n waters. Comperìlion for :tvnilnblc ship·
ping was intensive. Becausc of heavy losscs, AIIJed counrries dcsperately neeclecl
merchant ships, nncl the America n War Depanmem required hundreds of vessels
tO rransporr and maintain rhc A. E. F .. On thc wholc, howcvcr, America n n:wal forccs
in Eu ropean watcrs werc adcquarcly serviccd. T hcrc was no noticcablc shonagc
of gcnc:rnl s1orcs and dry goods. America n warships never sailc:d bccausc of a lack
of fuel. Food arti m es was in short supply. parricularly mcac. According 10 personal
joUinals, warships on parroland convoy dury frequemly wenc on short ratiom be·
foce rccurning ro base. Personncl arrachcd co the America n bartleships sc.>rving wirh
the Grand Flee1 ac capa Flow and .Roysrh werc pur on Royal Navy r:uions. Even
shorc facilities ran shorc of provtsions a1 timcs. Spare parrs proved ro be rhc mosr
scrious problcm. Ships deploying ro curopenn warcrs carried as many spare parts
~uch a~ propellcrs, ~re. ns rhey could. Ncvcrrhelcss, breakdowns occurred nnd at
rimes needed parrs werc: nor nvailablc.
ln che lìnalusscssmcnr, considering the lack o( cxpcriencc in large scale over-
seas logisrical requiremcnr bcfore 1he war and the magnirude of the supporr requircd,
1hc UnireJ Srates clid a commcndabll' job in mainrnining irs naval forccs in Euro-
pean warers during W orld War l. Nevcrcheless, wichout Allicd support, America n
warships and air squadrons could nm ha ve Càrried our chcir rcsponsibiliries in Eu-
ropean wnrcrs during World War l.