Page 317 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
P. 317

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. NAV AL  FORCES OPERATING
                IN  EUROPEAN WATERS  IN WORLD  WAR l


                                                 W llliAM N. STill,Jr.



          World War l was che first war  in which che Unired States 1  avy deployed ex-
       censive forces a  float and  a shore overseas. lo doing so it encountered significam
       problems char had co be addressed. This paper will discu55 che exteoc of logisrical
       support for American nava.l forces in European waters, problems eocou.nrered, and
       effons ro  resolve  them.
          Two fundamental factors derermined Amcrican logistical policy in European
       warers. Adminisrrarivcly, che American naval forces were u.nder coorrol of rbe Unired
       Srares; operarionally, however, American warships and naval air squadrons were
       assimilaced wirh Allied naval units, frequenrly under Brirish, french, or ltaliao com-
       mand.  For practical  reasons,  American  naval  forces  operating wirh  Allied  unirs
       received logistical suppon from che same source as cheir Bricish, Frencb or lral.ian
       counrerparrs.  This  was  especially crue  of fuel,  both coal  and oil.
          ln a memo prepared  afrer  rhe war was over, a  member of Admiral William
       S. Sims sraff wroce, "Throughouc che war we bave been praccically encirely depen-
       dem upon England forali repairs, supplì es and assiscance not obcainable from home
       .... England has uemendous resources for  repair,  rransporrarion, and supply ....
       All these (were) available co assise in adminiscering our scattered forces .... Our Forces
       in the Baltic, Adriadc, Salonika, Murmansk Coasc, Gibralrar, ecc. (were) ... ali fueled
       by arrangement with the Adm.iralcy. Sim.ilar cemarks apply co  importane (repairs)
       ... do~king,  rransporracion of supplies, issues of naval supplies, lubricaring oil. ob-
       caining rogs, barges, floating equipmenr, ere." m. The wrirer menrioned rhac simi·
       lar  help  was  provided by tbe  French and  ltalians,  bue  co  a !esser degree.
          The U.S. Navy's Office ofNavallntclligence reporced thac "When ever possi-
       ble, io procuring materia! from che British Admlrah:y, Royal Air Force, or che War
       Office, on in making purchases from privare firms, che exiscing machinecy of che
       Bricish  Governmear was  urj)jzed  ...  and every efforc  made co  avoid serting up a
       parallel  system of putcbased and supply" m.
          Self  sufficiency was che second facto r. Allied reserves in food, fuel, an d ocher
       economie and military supplies were nearly exhausted. The Bricish Admitalty and
       lacer rhe Allied Naval Couacil made ir absolurely clear thar American naval forces
       woUid h ave co  be· as self sufficient as possible. This is nor necessar.ily a conrradic-
       t.ion  co che first facror, because logist.ical support provided by che  AUies had ro be
       replaced  or  paid  for  by  rhe  Unired Srares.
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