Page 314 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

280 I)IMI'I'IH\ MINCIIEV

queslions, which were of inccrest only co that division. Togcthc:r w i rh thar the divi·
sion rended t'O organize the intclligeoce poinr dose co rhe scaff, rhar is ro say -
dose ro the Command point, or even in ir. Bue tbc piace where thc Command point
had 10 be siruared was chosen afrer specific con_sideradon_s, which meanc that ir
could not successfully also serve che purposes of the inceUigcncc. Thar was why in
Aprii 1916 the chief of the inreUigence section in che Second army, Captai n Dimiu
Bogdanov reported co che commandcr of che army. He reporred thar in the struc:-
mre of the 2t:h army chere were branches of dlfferenr in.telligence services, namely:
from the imelligence seaion, which was in rhe sraff of che 3rd Brigade of rhe llth
lnfantry Macedonian Divisioo, from che 7th lnfantry Rila Division, and from che
2nd lnfanrry Thracian Division, from rh e 6th and 7th border battalions. The chief
of t:he intelligence seccion of t:he a_rmy expressed his dissatisfaccion with the organi·
Zl!cion of the inrelligence scrvice in the divisions. He said ir was not com~cr thac
the same informarion was delivered by d ifferem couriers, bur thece was only one
source. Wicb such procedures ic was possible to check and confìrm the informa·
tion which was received.
According ro the chief of the inreUigence section in che army, i t was necessary
to reorganize the incelligence service, inorder cò avoid the above menrioned defeccs.
Caprain Bogdanov proposed chac che Division's and the 3rd Infanrry Bcigade (rom
the 11th lnfancry Macedonia n Division should be freed for intelligence service, and
their branches formed severa! intelligence poinrs. AU of chem were co be brancbes
of the ar-my sraii, and they had border u.nirs. Commandiog offìcers for tbese poincs
received commands and lnsrruccions direcdy from che inrelllgence seccion of the
army sraff. There were required the number of couriers and agencs w ho were given
rasks. The commanding officer received the originai informacion from their agencs
and senc ic by telegraph or by cdephonc directly co the inreUigencc secrion of the
aony sraff. A copy was senc ooly as information to the nea_resr sraff of a brigade
or a division. Tbe commanding officer gachered origina! dara, wrore ir down io
a notebook, then following a pre-arranged plan he scm it by horse or by cydisr.
He quescioned prisonecs of the war, and deserrers, be also had the rask of organiz-
ing councerinreUigence in border zones conuolled by che army.
ln order co cenualize tbe inceUigence service and mainly ics leadersbip, the
cbief of the 2nd Acmy sraff ocdered inrelligence staff of the border barralions to
leave cbeir inrelligence branches and co join tht? lmelligence seccion of che Parti san
Detachment. Ac the same rime the .lncelligence scction of che Detacbment come un·
2
der che direcc command of the Anny sraff<7l. In such a way the Army sraff broughr
the imelligence service in the army under ics direct contro!. The reasons for such
a siruation. were: che increasing need for imelligence informarion: thc increasing
ìmporrance of rhis informacion; che great risks that were raken by thc popularion
and by the plaroons of che Panisan Derachmenc; che increasing need for informa-
cion ro be delivered quickly.