Page 310 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

276 l>lM ITI!R M IN CII EV

co the Demchmems smff so thac they could inform che scaff of rhe resulcs of rhe
missions, which depcnded on che dcvelopmem of the local slruacion 061.
The anivicies of che inceJligence scrvice werc lìnanced eicher by fMARO, or
by che srafr of che 11th lnfancry Maccdonian Divislon. The money was givcn ro
che leaders of che points. Tbe sum they rcceived depcnded on che acdvities of rhe
poinr(l 7 l.
The incelligence was the most imporrane mission - rhe mission N l for che
poincs for garbering informacion. Nevercheless chey also had che cask of organizing
councerespionage in me border rcgions. Tbc leaders of che points had co organize
che surveiUance of suspiciuos people, who werc suspccted of having been sent by
che Entente spies.
The main efforts of councerinrelligence were direeted in che region berween
che Rivets Vardar and Tcherma, because ic was io chis area rhar rhe enemy's inrelli·
gence was most aetive a ad was ready co serve an evenrual advance of rhe Entente
rroops along che Vardar valley. During che period in quesrion che Greek partisan
detachments also operared in rhis area, as did me channels of che Greek incelli·
gence branches for che Tikvcsb region (18)_
A brief glance in rhe diary of an imelligence secdon will give us an idea of
me natllle of che rhings and aboU[ me casks char are received and fulfiled by che
serving in rbe Parrisan Detachmc:nt leaders and soldiers of IMARO.
In a noce on 14 February 1916 che leader of me inreUigence secrion Capraio
Panov wrote co che leader of che poi m for garhering information in che village Pecrovo
rhar ic was oot necessary co wrice "Divisions and Brigades" in che ioforrnarion,
but only che number of me regimenc, and where ir was siruared- in which wwns
an d villages. lnformation should be senr more quickly and acrivicy in a given region
was over, me scouts sbould pass imo anorher, but noc before 09l.
The inst.ruccions given co me commander of che Koukoush partisan platoon
senior noncommissiooed officer, Gots e Melhdourechki, were very similar. Oo l Srh
February 1916 he was given insrruccions nor co gamer informacion a long che whole
front, bur only in a definire region and he was asked co send che foUowing informa·
cion: up t0 whac poinr che double railway line v;ras builr, and in which direccion
(having in mind che railway li ne Thessaloniki-Koukoush); whether aoy rroops were
arriving in Thessalonik.i, and if so how manr, whether chcy were English or French
rroops; when and bow many ships had unloaded soldiers; w.hat kind of rroops wc re
staùoned on bom sides of che River Galic; whechcr there were any croops in the
viUages Daoutly and Rahma.nly aod what kiod they were; whar rumours were cir·
culacing among che Greeks; wbich direction rhe rrains were cravcUing a.nd up ro
which sta cio n mey were direcred; whac numbc.rs or ocher symbols thcre were on
che soldiers' hacs, epaulerres and cloches; where groups of horses were scadoned
and approx.imarely how many rbere werc; where guns wcre positioned, and where
chcy were in rhe parks. The leader Mczhdourechky was also given orhcr instruc-