Page 596 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

562 JOHN T. GllEE>'lWOOD

ic would have co fighc ics way amo the cominenr co bring che German Army to
bartle. In tace June 1940 che War Deparrment mandared amphibious training for
che !se lnfamry Division on che ean coasc and che 3rd lnfancry Division on rhe
wen c:oasr m_ T o counter Axis threacs to che Western Hemisphere, che foUowing
Oc[Qbec che War Deparcmem ordered che formarion ofchree "emergency expedi·
cionary forces." Task Force l, wich che lsr Infnmry Divisi an, bega n training for
an assaulr landing mission in early 1941 t8l. Wich litcle relevanc recent cxperience
in opposed laoding operatioos, che Army curned co che Navy and Marine Corps
foc usable tactical docrrine.
Becween che world wars, t:be Mario<: Corps and Navy developed a concepr
of amphibious warfare cencered on an islandhopping naval war againsc Japan in
the Pacific as laid out in War Pian "Orangc" 19>. The Marine Corps' ideas were
comained in ics Ttmati11t MaiJIIal for Landing Opt1'mionr (1934), which che Navy ado pc-
ed far ics 1938 landing operations manual (Fieer Training Publicacioo, FTP
0
167)Cl >. The Army largely borrowed the Navy's FTP 167 as ics initial doctrinal
publicacion on amphibious operac.ions, Ficld Manual FM 31-5. Landi11g OperatiMJ
011 Homk Shom (lune 194l)nu.
The Army madc scanc progcess in joinc amphibious training in 1940·41 ex.-
cepr t O idencify how very much .remained ro be do ne. J n )une a n d Seprember 194 l
cwo Joinc Training Forces, each composed of an Army and Macine division with
a partly imegraced joior scaff un der a Marine generai officer, were est:ablished un-
der Navy comma od in the Aclanric and Pac.ifìc Fleets. Joinr Army-Navy rrai.ning
exercises in Augusc 1941 andJanuary 1942 only confìrmed che joinc amphibious
force's lack of readiness far combar<l2). In February 1942 Admiral ErnestJ. King,
Commander-in-Chief, U .S. Fleet (COMlNCH). rried ro cemedy t:bese _problems by
making rhe two training forces imo t:be amphibious fo.rces and rescrucruring them
co include covering forces, cransporrs, and an Army-Marine amphibious corps !I3l.
The Army's Generai Headquarcers (GHQ) grew so dissacisfied wich t:bc progr-ess
of joint amphibious craining by eady 1942 thac ic asked the War Depanment for
approval ro esrablish Army amphibious rraioing cemers 114l.
Alt:bougb che prewar juint Acriort gave che lead in amphibious operacions to
che Navy, che devastaring losses suffered at Pearl Harbor, in che eady Pac.ific cam-
paigns, and global commicmencs forced it co focus majnly on rebui.ld.ing and ex-
panding ics major fleer combat elemencs-carriers, cruisers, barrleships, and
anri-submarine warfare vessels. Offensive joinr amphibious operations received so
lirt:le arreocion during the early months of 1942 chat few cargo and. croop rrans-
ports or landing craJt and. bou crews were available for tbe training or operations
of eicher che Army or Marine Corps. The Navy Deparcmcnr also rescricced che growth
of che fleer's amphibious elemenrs by limiting the flow of perso n nel an d the priori-
ties assigned co landing craft production (Ul_
In his Crruadt in ENropt, Owighc D. Eisenhower, chen Chief of che War Depatt·
ment's Operatìons Division (OPD), summed up the J\cmy's deepening frustraùon
over chis lack of preparacion: