Page 597 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

THE U.S. AJU>tY AND AMl'HitiiOUS WAIU'AAE
"A$ early as February 1942 we were worrying abour rhe production of land·
ing craft. Landing craft are primarily designed for offensive operations; it was difficult
ro develop a widespread inreresr in rhem when everyone was desperacely concecned
with defeose ... Ar rhe cime, however, rhe Navy was thinking only in rerrns of resroring
che fleet. They were not panicularly ioterested in landing crafr for furure offen·
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sives. Bue if we didn'r sran buiJding we would never attack" < >.
This siruation was criricaJ co che Army because in borh the U.S. Joinc Chiefs
of Staff and che Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff (CC$), Genera! George C. Mar·
shall, rhe Army Chief of Staff, and rhe Wa.r Deparcment argued fot an early inva·
si o n of Eucope as parr of che "Germany firsc" scraregy. As finally approvcd in Apri!
1942. rhis meanr a quick buildup of American aie and ground forces in the United
Kingdom "Bolero" with an emergency shore·to-shore cross-Channel invasion dur-
ing 1942 "Siedgehammer" ifa Sovier collapse appeared imminenc and a more de-
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veloped variant for 1943 "Roundup" t >. The deficiencies in landing crafr, boac
cr.e~•s, and craining, and the lingeriog Bricish relucrance to embrace rbese opera·
rions, greacly concerned Ma rshall and his key planners because tbey rhrearened the
Army· s basic strategie concepr for che war in Europe ( l81.
When in March 1942 King, now Chief ofNaval Operarions and COMINCH,
could oor commi:r che N avy ro supporcing such a cross-Channel undercaking w i rh
crews and boars, tbe Army offeud ro provide and train che required boar crews
forche landing crafr ro carry tbe iovasion force if tbe Navy would provide tbe boacs.
The Navy agreed ro tbis inforrnally. bue never in a formai JCS paper (19).
However, chis decision soon irutiated a major and concinuing dialogue be·
rween rhe Army and Navy on che overall mission, organization, composirioo, and
command of che amphibious corps assigned ro che Amphibious Forces of che Ar·
lanric and Pacific Fleers and on rhe prospettive roles of amphibious forces in U.S.
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and Allied srracegy<0>. By eady ]une Army planoers choughr chey had a ceocative
agreemem that pur shore-co-shore cross·Channel operations under Army conrrol
witb che Navy furoishiog landing craft and instruaors. Ship·ro-shore cra.ining and
operations rernained a Navy responsibiliry. New arnphibious corps would be formed
for the Cenrral and Souch Pacific and Souchwesr Pacific Area (SWPA) in 1942 as
che offensive forces for tbose chearers <2n_
By lacejune, however, che Navy decided chac rhe lack of landing crafr, ship-
ping, and Army combar divisions preduded any cross·Channel a crack unti! a t least
1943. Thar would give tbe Navy sufficiem cime co build landing craft and ttain
boar crews, so che Navy ordered Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, rhen commanding
che Amphibious Force, .Aclanric Fleer, co assome this ttaining mission immediate·
ly. As a resulc, over rhe summer tbe Navy rt>peacedJy poscponed signiog che centa·
rive agreemenc witb che Al:my untiJ tbe decision for "Torch" rendered che
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shore-ro-shore provis.ions moor <2 1. When rhe fmal JCS paper (JCS 8111) was signed
early in Seprember 1942, .it made no menrion of che Army's shore-co-shore opera·
cions and concluded: "Amphibious operacions areessentially che responsibiliry of