Page 602 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare
P. 602

568                                            JOHN T. GllEENWOOO

          mand the landings and operacions of America n ground forces in French Morocco
          while Hewitt, commanding the Western Naval Task Force, headed naval planning
          and operadons. Although rhe planning was done separarely, Patton and the War
          Departmenc racicly accepced unìry of command under  Hewin from alter the con-
          voy saiJed undl the ground forces had establisbed rhemselves ashore <48l. Eisenbow-
          er's policy on uniry of command and ÌtS parti al exrension m the Western Task Force
          was a  major stc:p toward resolving the uoubling quescioo of comma od of joinc am-
                                                               4
          phìbious operations and  the  transicion  from  naval co  land commander C91,
              In Europe and the Mediterranea n from "Torch" on, joinr amphibious assault
          forces carne under naval command until lodgements were successful, ar v.•hich cime
          command rransferred ro the ground commandersClOI. With some thearer variatious,
          Eisenhower's approach became srandard for mosr of che Army's warrime joint am-
          phibious operations and was also siroilar w  rbe uoified command arrangements
          for  American  joint operations approved  by che JCS  in  Aprii  1943 <Sll.
             By Seprember 1942, the EAC's once brighe furu.re  had quickly faded.  Deci-
          sions at che joint and combined levels on "Toreh" resulted in cutting the planned
          eighteen engineer regimenrs ro eighc engineer amphibian brigades and chen co three
                                      2
          operational and rwo  reserve brigades <) l.  When me  l.st  Brigade wem co England,
          the 2nd Brigade men became the training brigade wich me AGF's Amphibious T rain-
          ing Command.  Bue irs  future  and thac of the 3rd Bcigade,  whose full  acrivacion
          was placed on hold, were now bleak indeed as many of cheir  rrained amphibian
          perso n nel were sipboned off as cadres for che shore engineer unirs (36th and 540th
          Engineer Regimencs)  char  would supporr Parron's  "Torch'' landings CHl.
             Just as the simation appeared losc alrogerber, Colonel Arrbur G. Trudeau, the
          E A  C' s Chief of Sraff, learned rbac ~neral Douglas MacArthu.r' s Southwesc Padfìc
          Area (SWPA) lacked che landing craft and amphibious forces ro suscain any offen-
          sive opecations. He quickly sa w a furore for che amphibian brigades and approached
          che Services of Supply an d  Operarions Division wirh a  pian to send tbe brigades
          co MacAnhur. Within weeks rbe Army andJoinc Chiefs agreed ro deploy rhe 2nd,
          3rd, and 4th  EABs  co  SWPA along wich a  complete landing craft assembly  unir
          and plam C5 4 1.
             ln November 1942. the 2nd Engineer Amphibian Brigade was ordered co Aus-
          tralia where ir anived eady in  1943. MacArthur enrbusiasricaUy  wdcomed rbese
          unics because mei.r smaU crafc were ideally suired for moving men, equipment, and
          supplies in che shallow coasral and island-srudded wacers  in his cheater <nl.  This
          was especiaUy aue along che  norrh coasr of Papua-New Guinea where  che Navy
          had feared co go because of)apanese land-based aviaùon ar RabauJ1)61 . These ac-
          tions so significandy increased rbe Navy's inreresr in providù1g amphibious sup-
          porc ro MacA.rcbur thac in Decerober l942, after severa! mooths of delay, ir bastily
          creared che  7rh  Amphibious Force under  Admiral Dao Barbey <m.
             The year long tug-of-war  berween  rhe Army and Navy and wirhin the Army
          icself over orgaoizadon, planning, and uaining for amphibious operations fìnaJJy
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