Page 603 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

569
THE U.S, ARMY ANO AMPHI810US W'ARFARE
ended in Fcbruary and March 1943. Although many wrinkles cemained co be ironed
ouc, the "Torch'' landings in November 1942 had clearly demonstrated that che
Army and Navy could successfully pian and conduct a large joinr aod combioed
amphihious operation under unifìed cornmand C)Hl. Moreover, che long and often
acrimonious discussions on amphibious training and operarions between che Army
and the Navy and Marine Corps had evencually produ.ced a basic understanding
o n respective roles an d missions, organizarion, docrrine, an d command rh a t gener-
ally worked weU during che rese of che war C59). Marshall agrced chat che Navy would
cake over ali amphibious training in returo for ics support for che Army's fumre
operarions <6°l. However, implernentation of this agreemenr was subjecr co che de-
c.ision of rhe American overseas chcarer comroanders, w ho comrolled che organiza-
cion and training of che joim forces assigned co chem.
No w convinced of the imporcance of the Army's amphibian brigadcs, MacAr-
thur objcw:d to altering che plans for training and deploying the 3rd and 4th EABs
tbar were scheduled ro join che 2nd EAB C61l, While accepting MacArthur's demand,
che framers ofMarch 1943 Army-Navy agreemenr on amphibious training agreed
ro close rhe Army's Amphibious Training Command soon. The Engineer Amphib-
ian Command would disband in early 1944 after tho 4th Specinl Brigade shipped
our and elemems of rhe 5rh and 6rh Special Brigades were crained forche invasion
of france and sent co Eng.land C62l.
PromJune 1943 on, the ebree Enginee.r Special Briga.des and 7th Amphibious
Force underpinned MacArthur's scraregy in che Southwesc Padfic using che 800
LCVPs and 2,000 LCMs churncd our by rh e engi neer boa t asscmbly planrs in Aus·
tralia nnd New Guinea. The bcigades conducted 36 mnjor and 344 secondary shore-
ro-shore and ship-to-shoce operacions and made 148 combar landings in carrying
Army, Marine Corps, and Ausrralian Army amtult· forces from Nassau Bay, New
Guinea, to Ungaycn Gulf, Luzon, in che Philippines and on to che fast !ndics. Re-
taining theit origin.al boat and shoce otganization, these brigades employed .Army
amphibious doctdnc ~tnd operated borh under Army command and with che Na-
vy's 7th Amphibious Force. Their operacions were an exacting and succcssful rese
of the Army's originai 1942 concepc of amphibious warfare based on incegrared
bonr and shore operarions under Army command C63>.
The Army's role in amphibious operncions during W orld W ar Il was large
ancl crirical, bue ic remains little known nnd srudied roday. U.S. Army forces par-
ricipaced eicher in che assaulc or suppon phases in 58 of 61 wauirne America n
amphibious oper.acions. ln che Paci.fìc thc.arcrs, che Army und Navy condunc.d 39
major amphibious operarions involving a regimenral combac team (RCT) or larger
unir. The Army also cook pare with che Navy and Marine Corps in six major as-
saulr operations and supporred seven others <M>,
In Europc, cogerher witb Allicd forccs che U.S. Army and Navy werc respon-
sible forali si x of che largesr amphibious opera rio n sever conducred- No nh Afri-
ca, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Normandy, and Souchecn France. Among these was che