Page 604 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

570 JOHN T. GUENWOOD

largesc and mosc complex joint and combined amphibious operation ever under·
taken, Operation "Overlord", nn 6June 1944. Clearing cbe way across che beachcs
[or che American assaulc forces and chen supplying chem once che bcachbead was
esmblished were che lsc, 5th, and 6th Engineer Special Brigades. Once i t was finlshed
in Europe, the 1st ESB was shipped ro che Paci fie where ir handled che shore opera·
tions dur.ing che Okinawa campaign and was readying for che invasion of Japan
with che chrce othcr spccial brigades when the war ended (65>. Tbe EAC had h1·
deed accomplished ics originai mission, and much more.
The eacly yeacs of America n irwolvemenc in Wodd War 11 wece difficulc years
of preparadon, adjustrnent, confiicr, and compromise for the U.S. arrned forces.
In rhe midsc of a cotal global war, they had co learn co work wich each ocher and
their allies ro pla.n anù concluct sophisticaced joint and combined land, sea, and
air operations on an unpreccdemed scale. AJchough a crying experience, rhe Ar·
my's compromise with che Navy on policy, docrrine, and organization for amphibious
warfare conrribured imporcanrly to che shaping of its wartimc relationship wich
che U.S. Navy. the developmenr of overall Allied sttategy. and che condua of che
war againsc the Axis.
These warcimc cxpcrienccs also signifìcnnrly intluenccd che dcvclopment of
posrwar American joint and combined warfare doccrine and organization as well
as thc Army's role tbercin. In bis 'fhird Officia/ Report o( Decembcr 194~ to rhe
Secretary of che Navy, :Fteet Admirnl King clearly ourlined the imporrance of this
c:xperience: "The outscanding dcvelopmenr of this war. in the fìeld of joinr uoder·
rakings, was che pcrfection of amphibious operacions, che mosr difficulc of ali opcr-
adons in moclern warfarc. Our success in ali such operations, from Normandy ro
Okinawa, involved huge quantirics of specialized equipmenr, cxhausrive srudy and
planning. and rhorough training as well as complete integration of ali forces, under
unifìed command ... lmcgration and unificarion characccrizcd cvery amphibious
opera rio n of che war a od ali were successfoJ" (66).
l ho pc rhis paper w.ill spur a renewcd study of rhe U.S. Army·s critica] and
complex. cole ar rhe policy and opcracional levels in these joinr and c;ombined am-
phibious operations, for thcre is much yer w be learned char would benefìc roday's
milicary lcadc.rs and hiscorians.

NOTES
(l) The U.S. Army d id not endrdy neglecc the srudy of omphibious opcr~tions during
the interwar years. 1\r buth the Army War CoUcge and Command an d Genera! Staff Còll~ge,
landing operations were srudied, but thc course urne dt:Voted wns rclarivcly smali. The War
Plans Division of the War Dcpartment ~nemi Staif was also deeply involved in pl.annlng landlng
operacions as pan of its on·going duties. Individuai oftìce~;s also 1ltleoded thc N a val War Col·
lege, whcrc uudy of l:tnding opecations was much more inrense. Morcover, officers devoted