Page 600 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

S66 JOiiN T GREBNWOOO
brigade in 1943) of one boar and one shore regiment, each wich chrec banalions,
thar could lift and then suppon one division. A boac and shorc barcalion cogecher
could support a rcgimenra1 combat team (RCT), with individuai boar and shore
companies supporting che com bar bactalions. Wich ics assigned quanermascer, ord·
nance, medical and signa! units, an EAB numbered 363 officers, 21 w:uranc officers.
6,898 men, and 180 LCVPs and LCMs (~)l, Even as che EAC was srruggling rhrough
che summer of 1942, decisions werc being rakcn chac would radically alter ics future.
Neirher che U.S. Navy nor the British ever reaUy liked Marshall's con_cept for
che cross Chanoel acrack for 1942 or 1943. As for che U.S. Navy, .King saw ics
future in che Pacifìc where it couJd largely concrol operacions and noc in Europe
where it couldn'c <'6'!. The Bridsh Prime Ministcr, Winscon S. Churchill, and bis
mjjirary and naval leaders pcefecred an casier nut co crack. nameJy the Medi terra·
nean and Jroly, and more nnd berrer landing crafr before crying a direct attack against
the tougher Channel coasc and che Germans. Even afcer chey accepced the cross·
Channc:l pian, thc Bricish campaigned ro ccplace i t w i eh an eurly invasion of North
Africa, Operations "Gymnasc" or "Super-Gymnasc" (37l,
The Brìcish, moreover, cmphasizcd thac che smallcr landlng crafr (LCVs and
LCMs) thac che Navy had devcloped for ship-co-shore opcrntions and chat eh<: Army
imended co use would havc: greac diffìculcy in che rough wacers of che Channel.
They wanred largcr landing crafc chac could handle che Channel and could also gec
to che theater of operations on cheir own rath<:r than cakc valuable shipping space.
Hence, new generations of larger shore-co·shore landing craft wcre designcd and
built: che Landing Ship Tank (LSn, Landing Craft Tank (LC1ì. and Landing Craft
lnfancry (Large) (LCl(L)]. These landing craft altered che nature of amphibious oper-
aùons wben they rc.-ac.hcd the AJJied flcecs in meaningful numbcrs from luce t942
on, bue thcir proc.luccion was not a high prioricy for che N avy dudng most of
L 942 C.ll!).
In Moy·June 1942 the Navy changed course from refusing co accept responsi·
bilicy for ampbibious training and operatlons forche cross·Channel arcack co demand·
ing its rightful piace in drarge of chern in accordan.ce with J oinc Action. Ongoing
changes in Alli ed strategie planning an d concinuing Army-Navy discussions of a m·
phibious operations certainly helped shape rhis reversal, as did che Navy's afore·
menrioned doubcs abour thc likelihood of any cross-Channel attack. H owever, this
cha.nge wa.s also heavily influcnccd by conversatìons berween Lord I.ouis Mounr·
batten, commander of the British Combined Operations w ho was se n t to talk the
Am.erican leaders into rhe Norrh A(rican venture, and King during che Anglo·
America n meetings in Washingron an d Hyde Park, New York, in June 19421391,
Afrcr discussions with Marshall and King on "Siedgehanlmer·Roundup"',
Mouncbarrco mec separacely with King and personaily warned him not co allow
the U.S. Army co operate thc landing crafr in any c.ross·Channel atcack. "You are
selling che birthrighc of che Navy. W e ca n'c stop the invasion of Europe," Mounc·