Page 598 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

564 )OHN T GllUNWOOO
the Navy. Unti! such cime as che Marine Corps ca o be expanded ro fullìl! necessary
requiremenu for present and projeaed srraregy, i cis recognized rhar selecced Army
units must be ma.de available for training and pnrticipation in amphibious oper-
aùons" < 1 3>.
Even the e:xacc meaning and consequences of this paper were open co <JUCS·
rion, and further discussions dragged on i neo early 1943 before any fina! compromi.se
agreement couJd be re-.1ched. As the Navy maneu\•ered itself back imo full contro!
of its role io a.mphibious warfare, this fesrering impasse adversely affected the Ar·
my's planning and preparacion for a.mphibious operacions. Our of a sense of frus·
rration and urgeocy, throughour 1942 and inro 1943 the Army pursued rwo separare
ampbibious craining programs - one for ship·m-shore operations wirh che Navy
an d che orher o n ics own for shore-m-shore operacions <24>.
For ship·tO·shore operations, che amphibious corps were the principal batt-
leground. Here the inidal discussions foundered on fundamemal differences be-
cween rhe Army and che Navy and Marine Corps over rhe organizarion and role
of the Army divisions in assault landings0$l. Tbe Navy and Mari.ne Corps wanr·
ed spec.ialized Army light divisions that would be railored fora od only used in am·
phibious operat.ions. The Army Ground Forces (AGF), which replaced GHQ wirh
the March 1942 War Departmem reorgani2acion, were ada ma m thar ali Army di-
visions be srandardized for lacge·scale la od operacions and noc special.ized for limited
missions (26)_ This disagreemenr further hardened the Army's view on rhe Navy's
disincerest in amphibious operations as well as its own fundamenral differences
with the Marine Corps on amphibious organizadon and doccrine (27)_
In rhis area, as in maoy others, an underlaying cause far Army-Navy fricrion
was the abse.nce of a unified nacional defense strategy and com.mand srrucrure, some-
thing the Joim Board could oot provi de in the prewar years a od which was only
then being worked out foUowing the esmblishment of rhe Joim Chiefs of Staff and
an inregrated joint staff. The Army and che Navy and Marine Corps conceprs of
amphibious operarions differed subsrancially because of me services' fundamenral-
ly different missions and organizacion. To the Army amphibious operations were
invasions, a.cracks with unlimired objectives. and the oecessary first step in a long
and arduous land campaigo with huge logisrical re<Julre.menrs. To rbe Navy and
Marine Cocps rhey were seizures of specifìc. limited objectives, usually islands or
island groups, rhac could become advanced bases for a continu.ing naval cam-
paign (281. Hence, in amphibious operaùons Army planners always had operarional
and logiscical considerations char were far beyond the concerns of the Navy or che
capabilities of the Marines.
Jn a 9 Aprii 1942 memorandum that he ckafrcd for Marshall co scnd to King,
Eisenhower dearly delineared the differences becween the services on amphibious
forces and the differing operat.ional requin~mems in the Aclantic and Pacifìc: " In
the Adanric we may become involved in a cross-chan.neJ effon, with rhe consequent
need for laoding equ.ipmem designed especially for that purpose. Moreover any