Page 90 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

PI<A!IIK E. VANOIV" R

And chcn lessons did bcgio robe nodced as attacks withered in weJrers ofblood.
Quicker rhan officcrs, of course, soldiers caughr che need for field encrenchmenrs
and aftet 1862 hascy works appeared where armies congregaced. These, combined
wirh increased firepower, gave defenders rhe advanrage over artackers. So che offen·
si ve, always the way of winning, losr ics punch. Few fromal assaulrs succeeded a free
1862. Longer ranged ordnance pushed rhe oppos.ing uoops further apart; bayoner
charges faded from rhe scene. Carnage rook precedence over bartlefield decisions
- wasrage, in che rerms of World War l, replaced quick victory.
Since the North began wirh aU che milirary baggage of American history, ic
sruck prerry much ro precedenr; che Sourh, cur loose fro111 precedenr, tried new
rhings in organizacion, weapons, even command conceprs.
Circumsrances had a lor co do wirh rhe way each side foughc che Civil War
and cerrainly complicared command problems. Presidem Abraham Lincoln, unru·
rored in war, looked fora generai m organize the Union 's srrengrh and h uri i t againsr
che Rebels. Presidenrjefferson Davis, an able War minisrer under "President Franklin
Pierce, worked to orchesrrare operations of his own armies. Borb leaders soughc
capable generals as they srruggled co perfecr strategies for vicrory. Lincoln found
Gram afrer che Vicksburg campaign in 1863, and wichio a yeu made him generai
in chief of che Union armies. Davis fow1d Lee in cime for rhe Seven Days bardes
io 1862, and kept him in command of che mosr visible Confederare army. Lincoln
groped far and finally developed a modern, cenrralized commaod sysrem ro imple·
menr a straregy of pressare. Davis experimenred with various command arrange·
menrs co implemeoc a srraregy of rh e "o.ffensive·defensive"- he rried a deparunental
sysrem aod finally a chearer sysrem ro cape with disrance and communicacion
problems.
Wich super.ior numbers and resources, Gram soughc co crush the South by
force. Lee, with fewer men and resources, played a game of maneuver, dazzling
attacks, an d ligbming movemenr- hewing ro che idea thac the weaker side must
be che most audaclous. Davis' ocher generals, lacking Lee's skill or daring, fought
more rraditional, often prohibitively wasceful bactles, in che wesr - Alben: Sidney
Johnston's Sbiloh operarions, Braxron Bragg's Kenrucky campaign and his bartles
ac Murfreesboro and Perryville are examples.
Clearly che weaker side could nor continue fconral assaulrs against heavily en·
crencbed forces - weaponry forced a change .in ractical pbilosophy. Some recenr
srudies argue char even Lee's cactics were roo costly, chac he duew away rhe flower
of his army in assaults from the Seven Days to Gecrysburg; only rh e enrrenchmenrs
of the Wilderness in 1864 saved him from even more serious wasrage. There is
some uurh co chis ugurnenc, bue che facr is thar Lee's dadng did negare Union
suengrb in rhe easrern thearer; his daring did produce vicrori.es thar had a chance
ro win che war for rhe Confederacy.
The ocher side of rh e argumenr against l ee focuses on his colleagues. Di d rh e
tactics of che Brag&TS, che Beauregards, the Joseph E. Johnscons achieve better resulcs?