Page 91 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

THii AMHIUCAN OVIL WAR
Bragg achicved nothing sa ve loss; h e wasted his grcat opporrunity aftcr Chickamauga
in late 1863 un d his earlier bacdes were marvels of rimidity. Beau.regard's suategic
cuphorias ove.rwhelmed his good bartle sense, and resrricred his opporruniries ro
dcfcnsivc operarions.
Whar about Joseph E. Johnsron? Wounded a t Seven Pines in May 1862, hc
yieldcd command ofhis army to Lee. Never a favorire ofPresidenr Davis,Johnsron
did receive a daring assignmcnr as tbearer commander in tbc wcSt !are in 186 2
- a chance which might have broughr him lasring fame. But he could not rise
ro tbe challcngcs of his satrapy and yearncd for rradicional army commaod. Scill,
his campaign againsr Generai Shcrman fcom Dalton co Atlanta, Georgia, remains
a dassic of Fabian tacdcs. In this campaign he sought ro avoid combat except on
almost impregnable ground, 10 elude a supenor cnemy and raunr him deep imo
Confederare rcrritory. ro retrcat against his own base at Adanra and srrerch Shcr·
man's communicarions.Jefferson Davis rcmoved him from command injuly 1864
whenjohnston refuscd to explain his plans abour fighùng or holding Atlanta. His
rcplacemcnr:, Generai )oh n B. Hood, foughr rwo fìerce barrles for the ciry, lost them,
and rurned ro a ruinous campaign in Tennessee.
Did Johnsron ha ve the righe idea? ShouJd thc Confederacy ha ve srood on the
defensive cverywhere, conserved strength and yielded ground? Clearly this srcarcgy
had potenti al, had been tried oftcn in milirary history and had t be sanctiry of p cece·
dcnt in che Amcrican Revoludon. Yct was ir rt-aliscic? Prcsidenr Davis hacÌ to dcal
with che problem of srares' rights, wirh governors jealous of thcir owo borders.
Ground became a kind of unbargainable symbol -Confederare rcalities negared
some Slraregic opporrunjties. And tbe quescion rcmaios whethe.r or norjohnsron's
Fabian raccics would havc worked in an overaU sense. Probably nor, given the over·
whelming srrength of the Union armies.
And probably not, givcn the logisricaJ situacion of the CiviJ War. This was
the firsr of che so·called .. modero .. wars, the first bage conflicr of che era of the
Industriai Re,•olurion. This war spra"•led ove.r thousands of miles, spanned count·
lcss rivers, mounrain ranges, involvcd civilians as weU as soldiecs and bccame an
irresisrible agent of change. Distance complicared aJJ dimeosjons of conuol and
communicarion. Conuol depended as much on logistics as on command. And logiscics
rcmained a mysrerious elemcnt in war in 1861. Srudems of war knew about problems
of supplying large a cm ics from ancienr times. But when war e.rupted on the Ameri-
cao conrinent, new rools bcoughc new elements ro marciai supply and dcmand. Dis-
rances werc sroggering an d road systems weak co hopelcss - in mosr of tbc areas
of tbc south where che lìghting concenrratcd, roads we.re dirt or rock uaces, wirh
few macadamized highways. Some warerways would be helpfuJ, but thc mainsray
of milirary communkacions would be raitroads - an entircly ncw ingredient.
More chan 22,000 miles of track covered tbe North, with only 9,000 in the
South - and rhc Sourh had only rwo ma in transnaùonal lincs, one of which ran