Page 92 - 1992 - XVIII Congresso Internazionale di Storia Militare

58 fllii~'K E. VANDIVÈI<
exposed aJong che Confederacy's Norchern border. Diffcrences in mileage made
differences in logiscics. but che Souch made remarkably good use of its scarcer rails.
Neither side produced a logistical aar, bue both sides turned ro younger logisri-
cians to run a massive efforr, a n effon beyond che imaginings of bureau chiefs lon,g
wrapped in che red ra.pe of quarrermaster, commissary, enginecr, ordnance, medi-
cai and ocher supply agencies. The Norù1 rall!ed around rhe encrgies of Generai
Monrgomery C. Meigs, Quartermasrer Genera! of the Union Army. The South ral-
lied around the almosr Carnor-Jjke genius of Generai Josiab Gorgas, Cbief of Ord-
nance. Meigs organized a massi ve service capable of supplying food, dorhing and
camp equipmenr ro garganruan numbers of men. Gorgas, w i rh norhing to scarc wi.th,
created a small industriai system co produce arms aod ammunition, cannon aod
accourermencs.
Gorgas' challenges oucscripped rhose ofMeigs. Gorgas had ro produce weapons
from rhe beginning, had ro ransack rhe small Souchecn arsenals and umocies, co
scavenge battldìelds, and to organize a massive importadon efforr from ahroad.
Poreign supply sources were inrerdicred by Lincoln's naval blockade, proclaimed
in Aprii t861 and made fairly efficieoc by Lare t863. Gorgas waored ro arrange
his system logically, to create ao indusrrial heardand in Georgia, and disrrihure
supplies from there ro rhe field arrojes. Bur che weakness of the rransportation sys·
rem, the differem rail gauges (five different ra.illines of clifferem gauge mer in At-
lanta}, forced him co decenrralize disrribudon. He had to create smaU produccion
cemers, to push main depors co army bases, and small depors ro railheads. Ali of
this vasùy complicared problems of procuremem, manufacture a od issue, parricu-
larly as Confederate railroads dereriorared uoder heavy usage aod lack of repairs.
Gorgas's eoergy. his reJjance on ordnance officers of remarkable ability, made bis
patchwork sysrem work ro che end of che war. But wichout b.is special arrencioo
to blockade .runrung. the Ordoance Departmenc would not bave succeeded.
Lincoln knew me impotrance of sealing the South off from foreign commerce.
Gcao.t did nor see the naval dimension with Lincoln's daricy, so, as general in chief,
be concencraced more on barde rhan he mighc bave - be should havc aimed at
Wilimington, Norrh Carolina, early in 1864. Had chac imporrane blockade run-
oing porr fa!Jen, the Souch would bave been fìoished before winrer. Wheo ic did
fa!J in 1865, che war ended swifdy. Which is co say char blockade running kepr
che Souch alive, if not robusr. Srephen R. MaUory, Confederate Naval Seuecary.
rried various innovacions ro keep rhe Southem coasrs dear ofblockaders- iron-
dad warships (che bac:de becween che Mm-imnc and Monitor really ended wooden
meo·of-war), rorpedoes. even a submarioe. Bue blockade runniog remained che
Souch's main avenue co che wodd. And Gorgas, more tban mosr, knew how m or-
ganize blockade ruoniog. He coovinced President Davis co pcrmit rus and ocher
bureaus to buy ships co breach rhe Union cordon and so prolonged che war.
logisrics played another v imi role in Norrhern victory, almost by defau.IL. As
Nonhern forces invaded Southern areas. the Confederate Quactermasrer and Com·