Page 63 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

introduction of strict rationing and reserve stocks. Moreover, German industry was
able to maintain its production levels owing to the large pool of skilled labour and to
a relatively adequate amount of raw materiel. 21
The bombing report endorsed the targeting of the transportation system as the
most efficient means of causing damage to war potential. The strategic bombing of
the German transportation system had a two-folded effect. The survey argues that
it was the main reason for the gradual collapse of the German industry involved in
military production. The campaign also had a direct effect on military traffic. The
railway system in France was subjected to heavy bombing for about three months
before Operation Overlord and it “completely nullified the pre-arranged German
22
organization for dealing with troops movements, reinforcements and supplies”.
The lessons were transferred directly to the post-war bombing doctrine. The
Royal Air Force War Manual identified the goal of paralysing the movement of the
enemy as a primary objective of a bombing campaign. Attacks on the transportation
network and the fuel industry would deprive the enemy of the means to move his
troops and the goods used by the civilian society. 23
The results of the bombing offensive were revealed only after the war during
the extensive bombing surveys. It had been most difficult to assess the effects of
a bombing campaign. This highlights the role of intelligence. Experiences in the
Second World War had shown that the economic planning conducted in conjunction
with a bombing campaign was dependant on assumptions. These assumptions could
not always be verified during the course of the war as the enemy did his best to
24
conceal the actual results.
According to the bombing survey, it was not the amount of intelligence material
but the quality and interpretation of this material that mattered. If hard intelligence
25
on enemy capabilities to maintain production, to restore production, or to introduce
substitutive commodities was incorrect, then the bombing campaign could be aimed
at the wrong targets. The principles involved in supporting an amphibious operation
and combat on the ground next to the bridgehead were expressed in an issue of
the Amphibious Warfare Handbook, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious
Warfare. Air support for a combined operation was broken up into three phases.
The preliminary phase would be devoted to creating a favourable air and maritime

21 The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945. Report of the British Bombing Survey Unit ed.
Sebastian Cox (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 134, 166-167.
22
Ibid. pp. 118, 166-167. For the post-war analysis of the effects on the German transport system
during the Second World War, see also Churchill Archives Centre, The Papers of Air Vice-Marshall
Sydney Osborne Bufton, BUFT 1/39, “Lectures on Air Power in Modern War” by Lord Tedder, pp.
47-50 and diagram no. 7.
23
Royal Air Force War Manual, Part 1, Operations, pp. 28-30.
24
The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945, Vol. II: Endeavour, by Charles Webster
and Noble Frankland (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), pp. 214-220.
25
Ibid.