Page 66 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

66 airpower in 20 Century doCtrines and employment - national experienCes
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A Safe and Familiar Approach – First Plans

Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 took the British by
surprise. Although the British had anticipated this option as a possibility in Limited
War scenarios produced by the Joint Planning Staff only two weeks before the actual
nationalisation took place, the nationalisation was a genuine coup de main by Nasser.
The Joint Planning Staff and subsequently the Chiefs of Staff Committee concluded
that some 20 squadrons of Royal Air Force would be required to neutralise the
Egyptian Air Force and to support subsequent land operations including an airborne
operation. A large naval task force including three aircraft carriers and all serviceable
amphibious vessels would be necessary implement a maritime blockade, to destroy
the Egyptian Navy and to conduct seaborne landings of sufficient size at Port Said.
The army would have to concentrate three divisions, a large pool of supporting units
and the sole parachute brigade group. 35
The Joint Planning Staff produced the first outline plan within days of the
nationalisation. According to the plan the Royal Air Force was to execute two of
its contingency plans to concentrate several light bomber squadrons and air defence
squadrons to Cyprus. The Mediterranean Fleet was to be reinforced by two carriers
and a large army element of several formations was to be assembled. Six weeks were
36
needed to make the necessary preparations for the attack.
The Joint Planning Staff also briefly considered the feasibility of using air power
only to suppress the Egyptian defences and to unseat the Egyptian Government as
tasked by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. However, according the Joint Planning
37
Staff, “there would be a danger of not achieving the aim by bombing alone and of a
hiatus occurring therefore other forces could be brought to bear against Egypt”. The
plan included three phases:
1. Preliminary move of the attacking forces within striking distance of Egypt,
mainly Cyprus, Malta and Libya
2. Maritime blockade and air action
3. Assault on the northern end of the Suez Canal (Port Said) and a diversionary
38
threat against Alexandria.
The first plan did not have time to mature from a concept into a serious plan before
it was rejected by the Task Force Commanders. They considered that an amphibious
landing at Port Said, which is at northern entrance of the Canal, was not tactically
feasible. Instead, the force was to land at Alexandria which had a much better port
than Port Said. As a result, the land force –equivalent of four divisions – could be

35
NA DEFE 6/36, JP (56) 125, 18 July 1956, ”Forces for Limited War”.
36
NA DEFE 4/89, JP (56), 29 July 1956 “Availability of Forces for Action Against Egypt”.
37 th
NA DEFE 4/89, COS (56) 74 Meeting, 30 July 1956.
38
NA DEFE 6/37, JP (56) 31 July 1956, “Action Against Egypt, Outline Plan”.