Page 69 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

69
InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

Victory through Air – Musketeer Revise

The resolute attitude of Prime Minister Eden and his ad hoc war cabinet, the Egypt
Committee, deteriorate slowly during late August. The public opinion, American
scepticism and unavoidable involvement of the United Nations obscured the political
objectives. This, in turn, reflected to military planning. The D-Day was postponed
and various studies on the consequences of the postponement of operations were
46
produced.
The operational plans were also scrutinised in the course of time. The plan to land
at Alexandria was not without problems. The forecast of heavy civilian casualties
caused by the aerial and naval bombardment and apparent inflexibility – almost
a three weeks warning time was needed for the movements – impaired political
expediencies. This was fully realised by General Charles Keightley, the Commander-
in-Chief of the operation, who detested the Alexandria plan from the beginning.
As a result, he introduced a novel idea, Musketeer Revise, probably encouraged
by the Minister of Defence, Walter Moncton as early as on 17 August. According
to Keightley’s top secret note to Chief Air Marshall Dickson, the Chairman of the
COS-committee, “the present plan should be modified by carrying out a prolonged
and intensive air attack in the hope of making Nasser surrender without an assault.”
The Egyptian armed forces and oil were the core of the new concept.
47
The new concept was temporarily withdrawn due to the resistance of the Task
Force Commanders, responsible for carrying out the tactical plans, but general
Keightley had an opportunity to re-introduce the concept in the beginning of
September when the D-day was postponed once more. Keightley, perhaps partially
realising the new world order better than Task Force Commanders characterised the
consequences of the bombardment of Alexandria as causing “damage of civilian
town leaving a scar for many years”. The most appealing quality of the new concept,
was, however its evident feasibility as it “can be put on a short notice, and it is not
48
affected by postponement”.
The new concept, later to be developed in to a plan, was to include three phases:
1. Neutralisation of the Egyptian Air Force.
2. An air offensive combined with a psychological campaign aimed at destroying
the Egyptian will to fight.
3. Occupation of the Canal Zone. 49

46
NA DEFE 6/37, JP (56) 147, 26 August 1956, “Operation Musketeer – Implications of Postpone-
ment”.
47
NA DEFE 11/137, Keightley to Dickson, 19 August 1956.
48
NA DEFE 11/138, An undated note (either 4 or 5 September) by General Keightley on Operation
Musketeer.
49
NA WO 288/91, Headquarters Allied Land Forces, 11 Oct 1956, “Operation Musketeer – the Winter
Plan”,