Page 73 - Airpower in 20th Century - Doctrines and Employment

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InconclusIve experIment – brItIsh AIr power And the suez crIsIs, 1956. the AllIed AIr cAmpAIgn reAssessed

raising to 200 meters, due to the flak, for example, would multiply the amount of
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sorties by four.
Nasser realised the importance of radio as a means to deliver his message to the
masses. The propaganda of Radio Cairo had been a nuisance for the British for some
time. As a result, Radio Cairo and its substations were among primary targets for the
Allied bomber effort.
The final phase of air operations was designed to support the landing and
occupation of the Canal Zone. Majority of the efforts by ground attack planes would
be directed to isolate the battle area, to suppress AA-defences and to provide direct
support to the landing force, including an airborne landing in co-ordination with the
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Joint Fire Support Plan.
The targeting list produced by the Targeting Committee in mid-October is
revealing. The amount of transportation targets had fallen to two, as mentioned
previously. As a result, oil targets establish the core of the campaign designed to
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break the will of the Egyptians.

DAY Target Category
D – D+1 Egyptian Airfields
Radio Cairo
Block ships (2)
Egyptian Navy
D+2 Egyptian Airfields If required
Army Concentrations (3)
Radio Cairo (3)
Oil targets (17)
Transport targets (2)
D+3 Egyptian Airfields If required
Military targets (4)
Oil targets (26)
Coastal defences

Table 2: Target categories, 11 October 1956

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NA AIR 20 /10217, An Appreciation by the Bomber Command, 11 October 1956.
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TNA AIR 24/2426, Air Task Force/TS 287/56, 27 November 1956, “Report on Operation Musket-
eer”.
68 th
NA AIR 20/10215, Minutes of the 5 Meeting of the Targets Committee, 11 October 1956.